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The following Chapters present an account and evidence that development direction, a 
previously unexplored characteristic of performance feedback, reveals asymmetries in the 
transmission and acceptance of feedback. In short, I argue that feedback advising development in 
the direction of a decrease (e.g., “be less assertive,” “stop overanalyzing decisions”) is less likely 
to be transmitted by feedback providers, and less likely to be acted upon by feedback recipients, 
than feedback advising development in the direction of an increase (e.g., “be more assertive,” 
“analyze decisions more”). In a series of studies concerning roleplay negotiations, leadership 
effectiveness, and workplace behavior, I find people are more likely to transmit and embrace 
feedback to “do more” rather than “do less.” The first Chapter focuses on the behavioral 
dimension of assertiveness. Especially in workplace and negotiation contexts, assertiveness can 
lead to harmful consequences if over-or under-exhibited. Thus, breakdowns in the transmission 
and acceptance of assertiveness feedback, whether it directs the target to “be more assertive” or 
“be less assertive”, are consequential and merit special attention. The scope of the second 
Chapter is broadened beyond assertiveness, gauging feedback of opposing development 
directions that pertains to a wider set of behavioral dimensions. Here, the account in Chapter I is 
revisited and two processes that may underlie the asymmetric effect are tested. In short, Chapters 
I and II present evidence that not all “bad news” in feedback is treated equally. Instead, “do less” 
(vs. “do more”) feedback is especially susceptible to communication failures. Chapter III 
contains an overarching discussion of the findings as well as theoretical implications for the 
feedback and assertiveness literatures and practical suggestions for improving workplace 
	  
development dynamics. Finally, additional questions are addressed in the Appendix with further 
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For some time, my curiosity has been piqued by people’s (lack of) self-awareness about 
the behaviors they enact that others perceive as inappropriate and sometimes obnoxious. For 
several years, my interest was specifically focused on assertiveness. Alongside similarly 
inquisitive coauthors, I investigated whether jerks know that others think they push too hard, 
whether wimps are aware that others see them as pushovers, and whether appropriately assertive 
individuals know that they apply just the right amount of pressure. Simply put, we discovered 
that many people, much of the time, lack awareness (Ames & Wazlawek, 2014). The individuals 
we studied were not much better than chance in understanding what others thought of them. 
Appropriately assertive individuals thought they were under- or over-assertive, under- and over-
assertive individuals thought they were appropriate, and sometimes people were way off, 
thinking they were seen by others as over-assertive when in fact they were seen as under-
assertive or under-assertive when others saw them as over-assertive. 
We tested many of our questions about assertiveness awareness on samples of Masters of 
Business Administration (MBA) students enrolled in negotiations courses. In class, these 
students aimed to improve their bargaining skills and learn how to best conduct themselves in 
interpersonal conflicts by practicing with their classmates. Session after session, they worked to 
hone their negotiation approach, including their assertiveness. Having directly observed their 
lack self-awareness about their assertiveness, I knew that these students often had the wrong 
ideas about whether to modify their assertiveness and, if so, in what direction.  
I was struck by how students sometimes responded to distorted feedback, and other times 
ignored valid feedback, and often received muted or no feedback on a pressing development 
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need. All of this stimulated my interest in the dynamics of feedback: when and why valid 
feedback is transmitted (or not) and when and why feedback is embraced (or not) by recipients. 
Feedback indicates where one is in relation to where one should be, announcing the need to 
modify or maintain. The signals are not always articulated accurately and they are not always 
interpreted correctly, but they can affect how one understands herself.  
In the Chapters that follow, I explore how the developmental direction of feedback, 
whether it advises a decrease (“do less”) versus an increase (“do more”) in behavior, impacts the 
breakdowns in its transmission and acceptance. By decrease and increase, I make no strict 
distinction between quantity (“do this more often”) and quality (“do this more intensely”). The 
feedback I examine in the following Chapters features arguably more qualitative characteristics, 
but undoubtedly contains elements of both. This is not a distinction on which my predictions in 
the present work differ, but that is not to say that it is one of insignificance. Indeed, I theorize in 
the Appendix about how the effects observed in this work may differ for behavioral dimensions 
that have a monotonic relationship with outcomes (for which quantitative feedback may be more 
relevant). As it pertains to the present work, development direction refers to feedback with a 
combination of quantitative and qualitative prescriptions. 
This account that development direction impacts the transmission and acceptance of 
feedback stands in contrast to past narratives of feedback communication that only distinguish 
between positive and negative feedback. Such narratives treat all negative feedback the same, 
making no distinction between opposing development directions. Prevailing feedback 
scholarship also slants towards exploration of breakdowns in the acceptance of feedback (e.g., 
Ilgen, Fisher, & Taylor 1979; Kluger & Denisi, 1996). However, dynamics surrounding the 
generation and transmission of feedback are equally important to behavior modification 
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processes. The present work confronts this gap in the literature, accounting for failures in the 
transmission of feedback. 
The first Chapter is focused on the behavioral dimension of assertiveness. Especially in 
workplace and negotiation contexts, assertiveness can lead to harmful consequences if over-or 
under-exhibited. Thus, I believe that breakdowns in the transmission and acceptance of 
assertiveness feedback, whether it directs the target to “be more assertive” or “be less assertive”, 
are consequential and merit special attention. The scope of the second Chapter is broadened 
beyond assertiveness, gauging feedback of opposing development directions that pertains to a 
wider set of behavioral dimensions. Here, the account in Chapter I is revisited and two processes 
that may underlie the asymmetric effect are tested. In short, Chapters I and II present evidence 
that not all “bad news” in feedback is treated equally. Instead, “do less” (vs. “do more”) 
feedback is especially susceptible to communication failures. Chapter III contains an overarching 
discussion of the findings as well as theoretical implications for the feedback and assertiveness 
literatures and practical suggestions for improving workplace development dynamics. Finally, 
remaining questions are addressed in the Appendix with analyses of unique data as well as 




Overview of Evidence 
 
Chapter I 
Study Methods Key Evidence 
Study 1 
Masters of Business Administration 
(MBA) negotiation students 
participated in a negotiation roleplay 
and received qualitative feedback 
about their performance from their 
counterpart. A separate sample of 
online adults coded the feedback for 
signals under- or over-assertiveness. 
• Assertiveness feedback was 
asymmetrically transmitted such that 
feedback providers were less likely to 
explicitly signal to over- versus under-
assertive targets that their 
















Working professionals evaluated 
coworkers’ assertiveness and wrote 
feedback to them in a simulated 
performance review exercise. 
• The asymmetric transmission effect 
was replicated 
• The effect held, even among those 
who acknowledged the importance of 
target behavior modification 
• Over-assertive targets were more 
likely to receive performance 
compliments 
Study 3a  
MBA negotiation students received 
concrete, numerical assertiveness 
feedback compiled from ratings by 
multiple counterparts over time. 
Their initial reactions to this feedback 
were measured. 
• Assertiveness feedback was 
asymmetrically accepted such that 
over-assertive individuals were less 
receptive to assertiveness feedback 














Targets were reproached six months 
later for their subsequent reflections 
and reported development 
• Six months later, asymmetric 











Study Methods Key Evidence 
Study 1 
Revisited 
Qualitative feedback collected in 
Study 1 was coded for mentions of 
any behavioral dimension 
curvilinearly related to outcomes. 
Comments were sorted into three 
categories including receptivity, 
relationship focus, and 
miscellaneous. Development 
direction was noted. 
• Feedback transmission depended on 
development direction such that “do 
more” feedback was more frequent that 















Study 4 Archival multi-rater data from MBA 
students and their recruited 
informants was analyzed. 
Informants rated targets’ tendencies 
to overanalyze and under-analyze 
decisions and wrote feedback to 
them. 
• Feedback transmission depended on 
development direction such that 
informants were less likely to explicitly 
signal to over-analyzers versus under-
analyzers about modifying their 




Working professionals in addition to 
evaluating coworkers’ 
assertiveness, also evaluated their 
receptivity and delegation and 
wrote feedback to them in a 
simulated performance review 
exercise. 
 
In order to assess possible 
mechanisms, follow up questions 
were posed to feedback providers 
about their anticipated experience 
of delivering feedback. Feedback 
valence (negativity) and 
expectancy of behavioral change 
were measured. 
• Feedback transmission depended on 
development direction such that 
informants were less likely to signal “do 
less” feedback than “do more” feedback 
pertaining to receptivity and delegation 
• The effect held, even among those who 
acknowledged the importance of target 
behavior modification 
• Mechanistic evidence was mix, but 
points most strongly to expectancy of 
behavioral change 
Study 3a and 
b Revisited 
MBA negotiation students received 
comprehensive behavioral feedback 
compiled from ratings by multiple 
counterparts over time. Students 
indicated their main takeaways from 
this feedback. 
• Feedback is accepted asymmetrically 
such that individuals were less 
receptive to feedback indicating a need 



















Chapter I: Persistently Over-Assertive: 
Asymmetric Transmission and Acceptance of Assertiveness Feedback 
 
Over-assertive people—those seen by others as pushing too hard to get their way—run 
considerable risks in their social and professional lives, where their behavior can undermine both 
their relationships and their instrumental outcomes (e.g, Ames & Flynn, 2007; Kipnis, Schmidt, 
& Wilkinson, 1980; Schweinsberg, Ku, Wang, & Pillutla, 2012). Recent work (Ames & 
Wazlawek, 2014) suggests that not only are a meaningful share of people seen by others as 
pushing too hard, but also a surprising number of over-assertive individuals fail to recognize how 
they come across. Many people are reliably seen by those around them as crossing the line and 
pressing for too much yet think they are doing just fine, oblivious to the need for change. Here, I 
focus on a seemingly unanswered question: Why do over-assertive individuals persist in their 
risky and self-limiting behavior? 
I suspect that part of the answer involves a double failure in the communication of 
feedback. First, counterparts and onlookers may be especially reluctant to transmit explicit 
feedback to over-assertive individuals. Second, over-assertive individuals may be especially 
unwilling to accept it. Put another way, not only are the feedback signals faint, but what 
feedback is transmitted also bumps up against a resistant forcefield. 
My aim is to develop and test this account that critical assertiveness feedback is 
especially susceptible to communication failure in the case of over-assertiveness. While past 
work (e.g., Ilgen, Fisher, & Taylor 1979; London, 2012) has explored the impact of positive 
versus negative feedback—the difference between “good news” and “bad news”—my account 
goes beyond valence. In this Chapter, I focus on the domain of assertiveness and consider the 
dynamics surrounding two different directions of negative feedback: an indication of too much 
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assertiveness or an indication of too little. I argue that the dynamics around these two kinds of 
bad news are markedly different. 
My account draws on Kluger and Denisi’s (1996) feedback intervention theory, 
integrating it with literature on voice and psychological safety (e.g., Edmondson, 1999; Van 
Dyne & Le Pine, 1998) to characterize both the transmission and acceptance of feedback 
regarding over-assertiveness. In doing so, I am able to shed light on factors associated with the 
persistence of over-assertive behavior and, at the same time, advance the field’s understanding of 
when and why feedback processes may have limited benefits for personal development (Kluger 
& Denisi, 1996). I return to implications for the assertiveness literature as well as for scholarship 
on feedback and development dynamics in my conclusion. 
Feedback and Assertiveness 
Reluctance to transmit negative feedback has been explored in past work (e.g., Blumberg, 
1972; London, 2012; Tesser & Rosen, 1975). People fear adverse repercussions of providing 
negative feedback (Fisher, 1979; Napier & Latham, 1986) and doing so is often regarded as an 
uncomfortable task that is frequently rushed, delayed, or avoided altogether (Kopelman, 1986; 
Meyer, 1991). Thus, individuals with the most room for improvement frequently receive the least 
feedback (Larson, 1986)—and what they do receive is often positively distorted due to false 
enhancement and the exclusion of harsh content (Benedict & Levine, 1988).  
 Prior research has also noted resistance to accept negative feedback (e.g., Ilgen, et al., 
1979; Kinicki, Prussia, Wu, & Mckee-Ryan, 2004; Sitzmann & Johnson, 2012). Recipients of 
negative feedback sometimes jump to pointing out flaws that nullify it or justify their behavior 
(Brett & Atwater, 2001; Meyer, 1991; Sheldon, Dunning, & Ames, 2014; Stone & Stone, 1985).  
Although individuals who accept negative feedback are more likely to take steps to improve 
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(Maurer, Weiss, & Barbeite, 2003), problematic behavior is likely to persist in those who reject 
it.  
 In this Chapter, I focus on negative feedback that pertains to assertiveness1, and examine 
how both the reluctance to transmit feedback, and resistance to accept it, may vary depending on 
the specific prescription for behavior modification (in Chapter II, I move beyond assertiveness). I 
rely on the folk meaning of assertiveness employed in every day judgments of interpersonal 
behavior, namely one’s tendency to speak out and stand up for his or her own interests (Ames, 
2009). People can, and often do, get assertiveness wrong in the eyes of onlookers by exerting too 
little or too much (Ames & Wazlawek, 2014). Thus, negative assertiveness feedback may direct 
the target to be either more assertive or less assertive. 
Individuals seen as under-assertive or over-assertive may suffer accumulating 
instrumental losses and experience deteriorating interpersonal relationships. Since missing the 
mark in either direction can have meaningful costs, it is possible that negative feedback would be 
accepted and internalized with equal likelihood in both cases. In other words, an “all bad news is 
the same” account could argue that if under-assertiveness and over-assertiveness are both 
problematic, negative feedback recipients may receive and adopt (or resist) criticism pertaining 
to both kinds of issues with equal likelihood. Feedback intervention theory, for example 
considers feedback valence, but makes no distinction based on the direction of development 
needs (i.e., to exhibit more or less of a given behavioral quality). Subsequently, the meta-analysis 
conducted as the initial test of feedback intervention theory yielded no significant effects of 
feedback valence on performance (Kluger & Denisi, 1996). The authors note that although 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Important work has been done on related topics including workplace victimization (Aquino & 
Thau, 2009), workplace harassment (Björkqvist, Österman, Hjelt-Bäck, 1994), bullying 




negative feedback valence should increase performance, important moderators that influence this 
effect have yet to be accounted for. 
 My account identifies feedback direction as one such moderator in the domain of 
assertiveness. Based on past research on feedback and on assertiveness, I suspect that the 
resistance to accepting feedback is amplified in the case of over- versus under-assertiveness. The 
nature of over-assertiveness is to push back against contrary viewpoints and remain unyielding to 
others (e.g., Ames & Flynn, 2007). Thus over-assertive targets may have a built-in tendency to 
overtly challenge and reject negative assertiveness feedback and the people who provide it. 
Indeed, individuals high on related dimensions such as narcissism and self-esteem have been 
shown to disparage assessment methods and derogate and even aggress towards evaluators 
following negative feedback (e.g., Bushman & Baumeister, 1998; Kernis & Sun, 1994; Smalley 
& Stake, 1996). 
  This inclination to reject negative feedback may not only keep over-assertive individuals 
from accepting it, but also keep potential providers from transmitting it. Relevant work by 
Walumbwa and Schaubroeck (2009) showed that employee voice behavior, or the expression of 
constructive challenge (Van Dyne & LePine, 1998), is diminished in the absence of 
psychological safety, or the belief that there is no punishment for interpersonal risk-taking 
(Edmonson, 1999). Accordingly, people may feel unsafe about voicing feedback to over-
assertive individuals, anticipating negative consequences (e.g., hostile reactions) of doing so.  
 As a result, being over-assertive may go hand-in-hand with a lack of awareness because it 
simultaneously dampens the likelihood of feedback being provided and diminishes the chance of 
it being internalized. This stands in contrast to the account of all bad news being treated equally, 
which could posit that the bigger the problem, the more likely feedback is to be transmitted and 
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acted upon. Instead, I claim that two different varieties of bad news—those prescribing different 
directions for interpersonal assertiveness—play out differently. Compared to under-
assertiveness, over-assertiveness is far more susceptible to communication failures in both 
transmission and acceptance.  
Hypothesis 1: Assertiveness feedback will be asymmetrically transmitted such that  
 providers will be significantly less likely to transmit such feedback to over- versus under-
 assertive targets. By transmit, I refer to explicitly signaling that the target’s 
 assertiveness level should be modified. 
 Hypothesis 2: Assertiveness feedback will be asymmetrically accepted such that over-
 assertive targets will be significantly less likely to accept such feedback than under-
 assertive targets. By accept, I refer to the extent that targets attend to and value such 
 feedback and attempt to modify their behavior accordingly. 
Overview of Research 
 I tested these hypotheses in a series of studies, considering controlled negotiations, 
workplace behavior, and personal development over time. In the wake of a controlled 
negotiation, I examined whether negotiators would transmit feedback asymmetrically, signaling 
over-assertiveness to counterparts who pushed too hard less frequently than signaling under-
assertiveness to counterparts who should have pushed harder (Study 1). In a simulated feedback 
exercise, I asked a sample of working professionals to provide job performance feedback to 
coworkers, testing again for asymmetric signaling (Study 2). I also examined asymmetric 
acceptance of feedback among negotiators who were confronted with concrete evidence of their 
inappropriateness. In the wake of feedback, I examined whether over-assertive negotiators 
recognized and accepted their feedback and whether they make plans to change. Six months 
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later, I followed up with the same people to gauge whether and how their behavior had changed 
in the intervening period. 
My argument and evidence make two noteworthy contributions. First, they extend past 
work on assertiveness by examining the transmission and reception of feedback among over-
assertive individuals and under-assertive individuals. Prior research has identified that over-
assertiveness is a common syndrome and that a good share of over-assertive individuals are 
unaware of how they are seen (Ames & Wazlawek, 2014). However, past work has not clarified 
why over-assertiveness might persist. The present work accounts for at least part of why this 
might be so, thus contributing to the larger account of how problematic assertiveness emerges, 
unfolds, persists, and can be resolved. 
Second, the present research goes beyond past work on feedback by arguing that the 
reluctance to transmit feedback and the rejection of feedback is not solely a matter of “bad 
news.” Prior research on feedback (e.g., Blumberg, 1972; Ilgen et al., 1979) has identified the 
general challenges involved in conveying negative evaluations to others and in accepting such 
evaluations of oneself. However, past work has not specifically addressed the important domain 
of interpersonal assertiveness nor has it explored the ways in which the direction of development 
needs could affect communication failures. I find that the particular direction of feedback—the 
kind of bad news—matters. My results revolve around assertiveness, contrasting the over- and 
under- directions, but I think the findings reveal some more general ways in which feedback 
dynamics may vary depending on content. Models of feedback transmission and acceptance may 




In making these contributions to the scholarly literature, the present work also contains 
practical implications. For assertiveness, the results highlight that over-assertiveness may be a 
resilient syndrome that requires special efforts to correct. For feedback, the results show that 
organizational processes that rely on informants spontaneously providing feedback and targets 
effectively responding to those signals may not be sufficient for some performance dimensions. 
Study 1 
My first study gauged whether assertiveness feedback was less often transmitted to 
targets seen as over-assertive versus under-assertive. Masters of Business Administration (MBA) 
students rated, in the wake of a negotiation roleplay, whether they saw their counterpart as 
under- or over-assertive and also wrote qualitative feedback to them. A separate sample of online 
adults (henceforth referred to as “judges”) was then asked to indicate whether this qualitative 
feedback signaled under- or over-assertiveness. My central question was: Could the judges, 
based on the qualitative feedback transmitted to the target, identify whether the feedback author 
thought the target was under- or over-assertive? As outlined in Hypothesis 1, I expected judges 
to detect fewer signals of over-assertiveness than under-assertiveness in the feedback. In addition 
to feedback written by negotiators to one another, feedback written by neutral observers of the 
negotiation (classmates of the students negotiating) was also gathered. Expectations for this 
observer feedback were the same. 
Method 
Participants and procedure: Generating feedback. Three hundred MBA students 
enrolled in negotiations courses at a United States business school participated in a role-play 
negotiation with a randomly paired fellow student. One hundred thirty (43.33%) were female. 
Average age was 28.51 years (SD = 2.84). One hundred sixty-six (55.33%) identified themselves 
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as Caucasian, 69 (23.03%) as Asian or Asian American, 32 (10.67%) as Latino or Hispanic, and 
8 (2.67%) as African American.  
For pedagogical reasons, students were randomly assigned to complete one of two 
negotiations revolving around either the sale of a factory or the licensing fees for a graphic 
novel. Both negotiations featured a positive bargaining zone (i.e., the buyer was willing to pay 
more than the least the seller would accept). Though only two students were engaged in the 
negotiation, a total of three students were involved in the overall procedure. Two students were 
assigned to the role of either buyer or seller, and an additional student was designated as an 
observer. The buyer and seller were tasked with actually engaging in a negotiation, while the 
observer was tasked with silently watching them negotiate. Students were given approximately 
20 minutes to review their materials and complete the procedure. Immediately following the 
negotiation and prior to learning more details about the case (e.g., what share of the bargaining 
zone they had earned) students separately completed online surveys, aware that their responses 
would not be shared with their fellow student in any identifiable way. Negotiators rated their 
counterpart’s performance and provided him or her with written feedback. Observers provided 
similar performance ratings and written feedback.  
Participants and procedure: Judging feedback. Subsequently, I asked a separate set of 
online judges to review the contents of these written feedback comments. Five hundred and six 
US adults each assessed a small sample of comments in exchange for payment through 
Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk system. Of these 506, 64 gave an incorrect answer to at least 
one of the 12 attention check questions embedded throughout the survey (e.g., with instructions 
to pick the right-most option). Of the remaining 442 online judges, 232 (52.49%) were male. The 
vast majority (77.83%) identified themselves as Caucasian, 6.79% as East Asian, 6.56% as 
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African American, and 4.98% as Hispanic/Latino. Nearly all (88.24%) reported having at least 
some college education; 40.95% had a Bachelor’s degree and 9.73% had a Master’s or advanced 
degree. A small portion (15.84%) identified themselves as “not working,” 35.97% identified 
themselves as working part-time or on a freelance/project basis, and 44.12% said they were 
working full time. Average age was 33.41 (SD = 11.04).  
After consenting, judges were asked to read short passages of feedback and consider, 
from a third person perspective, what was indicated about the recipient’s behavioral 
weaknesses2. In order to provide the judges with some context for interpreting the passages, they 
were informed that these passages were actual feedback given to negotiators who had 
participated in a simulated negotiation and pertained primarily to the negotiators’ weaknesses 
and how they could improve. 
Measures: Generating feedback phase. 
Target assertiveness. In the survey that was conducted immediately after the negotiation, 
counterparts and observers rated their target’s assertiveness on a five-point scale that included 1 
(Very under-assertive), 2 (Somewhat under-assertive), 3 (Appropriately assertive), 4 (Somewhat 
over-assertive), and 5 (Very over-assertive). 
Written feedback. In the same survey, negotiation counterparts and observers were also 
asked to write a few sentences in response to the prompt “What weaknesses or areas for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Half of judges were instructed to consider the feedback from a second person perspective, 
imagining that they themselves received this feedback and evaluating what it suggested about 
their own behavioral weaknesses. In doing this, I was able to ensure that judges’ ratings were not 
affected by whether they considered the passages from a third person or second person 
perspective. Though I did not expect results to differ between conditions I anticipated that a 
second person perspective may have provided more real world validity, however a third person 
perspective may have provided more unbiased, critical ratings. As expected, results did not differ 




improvement did you observe in your target’s behavior or style during the negotiation? What 
things would you encourage them to work on or develop?” 
In preparation for the second phase of Study 1, all 1220 feedback comments were 
organized on two dimensions: feedback author type (counterpart or observer) and feedback 
authors’ rating of their target’s assertiveness (for simplicity, I collapsed the five-point 
assertiveness scale down to three levels: under-, over-, and appropriately assertive). Counterparts 
wrote feedback to 106 targets whom they rated under-assertive, 413 appropriately assertive, and 
90 over-assertive. Observers wrote feedback to 160 targets whom they rated under-assertive, 351 
appropriately assertive, and 100 over-assertive. From each of these six categories, 50 feedback 
comments were randomly selected and included in a set of 300 that were subsequently reviewed 
by judges (i.e., the Mechanical Turk participants)3.  
Measures: Judging feedback phase. 
Assertiveness feedback signal. Each online judge read a random set of 9 feedback 
comments and was asked to evaluate the author’s perception of the target’s assertiveness. 
Specifically, judges were asked, “Based on this feedback, how do you think the person providing 
this feedback would categorize their classmate’s assertiveness?” Judges indicated their responses 
on using the same five-point scale that negotiation counterparts and observers used in the first 
phase of the Study to rate their targets’ assertiveness. Judges were also given the option to select 
“Not applicable–this comment indicates nothing about assertiveness.” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  The 150 feedback comments coded in Study 1 were randomly selected from a total pool of 
1220 comments given to under- and over-assertive negotiators in our sample. Twelve comments 
(8%) were excluded and replaced by another comment randomly selected from the larger pool  
because they contained too much negotiation jargon (e.g. “BATNA”, “resistance point” or 
specifics about the negotiation exercise for online coders to understand (e.g. “plant not valued at 





Assertivneess feedback signal. Each feedback comment was, on average, rated by 13.34 
judges (minimum: 6, maximum: 19). Each comment that received one third4 or more “not 
applicable” ratings was categorized as such. All other comments were categorized based on the 
average rating they received on the five-point assertiveness scale. Comments that received an 
average rating of 1-2.49 were categorized as indicating under-assertiveness, 2.5-3.49 appropriate 
assertiveness, and 3.5-5 over-assertiveness.5  
I began by examining judges’ categorizations of feedback comments authored by 
counterparts. Of comments written to targets seen as under-assertive, judges categorized 52.00% 
as indicating under-assertiveness. Of comments written to targets seen as over-assertive, judges 
categorized 6.00% as indicating over-assertiveness (X2(1,100) = 25.69, p < .01; See Figure 1). 
That is, as predicted by Hypothesis 1, judges were vastly less likely to detect signals of over-
assertiveness than under-assertiveness. Furthermore, 6.00% of comments written to under-
assertive individuals, versus 20.00% of comments written to over-assertive individuals, were 
categorized by judges as indicating nothing about assertiveness (X2(1,100) = 4.33, p = .04)6.  
Next I examined judges’ categorizations of feedback comments written by observers and 
discovered similar results. Of comments written to targets seen as under-assertive, 68.00% were 
categorized by judges as indicating under-assertiveness. Of comments written to targets seen as 
over-assertive, 22.00% were categorized by judges as indicating over-assertiveness (X2(1,100) = 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The same pattern of results emerged when comments rated “not applicable” by a fourth or 
more, or a half or more are categorized as such—with one exception (described in footnote 5).  
5 The same pattern of results emerged based on alternative categorizations of the data including 
1-2.99: under-assertive, 3.01-5: over-assertive, as well as 1-2.74: under-assertive, 3.25-5: over-
assertive. 
6 This difference loses significance when comments rated “not applicable” by half or more 
(instead of a third or more) are categorized as such.  
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21.37, p < .01). Furthermore, 4.00% of comments written to under-assertive individuals, versus 
12.00% of responses written to over-assertive individuals were categorized by judges as 




Gender. Though I had no a priori hypotheses about gender effects, I tested for them in the 
data. Results did not differ based on target gender. The proportions of females considered under-
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males (X2(285) = 0.26, p = .61; X2(285) = 0.53, p = .47). Furthermore, counterpart feedback 
written to under- and over-assertive female targets that was categorized by judges as indicating 
under- and over-assertiveness, respectively, did not differ from that written to male targets 
(X2(49) = 0.55, p = .46; X2(45) = 0.16, p = .69). Similarly, I saw no difference in observer 
feedback (X2(46) = 1.36, p = .24; X2(48) = 1.02, p = .31) 
Discussion   
 Study 1’s results supported Hypothesis 1, suggesting that assertiveness feedback was 
asymmetrically transmitted. Judges were vastly less likely to detect a signal of over-assertiveness 
in comments written by an informant to a target the informant saw as over-assertive than they 
were to detect a signal of under-assertiveness in comments written by an informant to a target the 
informant saw as under-assertive. In other words, the explicit feedback signals transmitted to 
over-assertive individuals are far more faint than those sent to under-assertive individuals. 
Unlike messages to under-assertive individuals, the clear majority of messages to over-assertive 
individuals contained no signal about assertiveness at all.  
Study 2 
Study 1 focused on a single, well-defined episode. Study 2 shifted to capture more 
comprehensive job performance feedback, examining the same asymmetric signaling effect in a 
more real world context with a distinct sample of working professionals. Study 2 also addressed 
the possibility that asymmetric signaling merely reflects asymmetric importance by asking 
participants to indicate how important it was that a coworker’s under- or over-assertiveness be 
reformed. In other words, if under-assertiveness was seen as more problematic than over-
assertiveness, asymmetry in transmission may simply reflect the magnitude (rather than type) of 
development needs. In contrast, I expected to again find that assertiveness feedback was 
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asymmetrically transmitted, even among those who acknowledged how important it was that the 
target modulated his or her assertiveness.  
Method 
Participants and procedure. One hundred seventy-seven United States adults completed 
an online survey in exchange for payment through Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk system. Of 
these 177, 23 (11.06%) gave an incorrect answer to at least one of the five attention check 
questions embedded throughout the survey (e.g., with instructions to pick the right-most option). 
Of the remaining 154 participants, 89 (57.79%) were male. The vast majority (81.82%) 
identified themselves as Caucasian, 3.25% as East Asian, 6.49% as African American, and 
7.14% as Hispanic/Latino. Nearly all (89.61%) reported having at least some college education; 
37.66% had a Bachelor’s degree and 15.58% had a Master’s or advanced degree. Respondents 
were asked about their employment status at the beginning of the survey and any that did not 
identify themselves as working part-time or full-time (31) were directed to an unrelated survey. 
Thus, all 154 participants in this study indicated that they were working part-time or full time. 
Average age was 33.03 (SD = 10.08). 
After consenting, participants were asked to list the initials of three coworkers whom they 
understood and knew well so that I could refer to each individually in subsequent questions.  
Measures 
Participants evaluated each coworker on several performance dimensions. Only measures 
of assertivenes were pertinant to my investigation, but other measures (e.g., of time management, 
communication, delegation) were also included. Finally, participants wrote performance 
feedback to one coworker. 
Coworker assertiveness. Participants were asked to evaluate each coworker's 
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assertiveness using the same five-point scale from Study 1 that included 1 (Very under-
assertive), 2 (Somewhat under-assertive), 3 (Appropriately assertive), 4 (Somewhat over-
assertive), and 5 (Very over-assertive). 
Importance of assertiveness development. Participants also indicated the extent to which 
each coworker’s assertiveness was a problem that necessitated development using a three-point 
scale including 1 (Not really a problem, development is not needed), 2 (Somewhat of a problem, 
development is somewhat needed), and 3 (Definitely a problem, development is definitely 
needed).  
Feedback. Finally, participants were told to imagine they had been asked to provide 
feedback for a coworker as part of a new performance feedback program being implemented at 
their workplace. Participants were encouraged to consider the coworker’s performance and 
behavior at work and comment on weaknesses they should modify and strengths they should 
reinforce. Participants were further instructed to imagine that this feedback would actually be 
sent to their coworker via email. To limit survey fatigue, feedback was requested for only one of 
the three coworkers evaluated. Though participants were not aware that this was the basis for 
selection, feedback was requested for the coworker rated either most or least assertive. Two 
independent coders read all 154 coworker feedback comments and indicated whether each 
mentioned becoming more assertive, less assertive, or made no mention of assertiveness7. Coders 
agreed on 88.31% of cases and were able to come to an agreement on those remaining. 
Results 
Assertiveness feedback signal. I first examined whether participants were less likely to 
transmit assertiveness feedback to their over- versus under-assertive coworkers. To do this, I 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  The same pattern of results emerged when comments were reviewed by a set of online judges 
through Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk system, similar to the proceedure detailed in Study 1.  
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categorized coworkers based on participants’ ratings of their assertiveness level and the extent to 
which it was a problem that required development. First, I collapsed the five-point assertiveness 
perception scale to three levels representing under-assertive (1 or 2), appropriately assertive (3), 
and over-assertive (4 or 5). Next, I collapsed the three-point need-for-development scale down to 
two levels representing either that the coworker’s assertiveness was not a problem and did not 
require development (1), or that it was a problem that did require development (2 or 3). When 
crossed, these two collapsed scales created six categories. My two main categories of 
comparison were the 46 (29.87%) under-assertive coworkers whose under-assertiveness was 
considered a problem requiring development and the 56 (36.36%) over-assertive coworkers 
whose over-assertiveness was considered a problem requiring development.  
  Of the feedback comments written to under-assertive + problematic coworkers, 39.13% 
indicated becoming more assertive. Of those written to over-assertive + problematic coworkers, 
10.71% indicated becoming less assertive (X2(1,102) = 11.33, p < .01). Furthermore, this effect 
remained significant in the expected direction when the sample was limited to coworkers whose 
assertiveness level was rated 3 (Definitely a problem, development is definitely needed). Of the 
feedback comments written to under-assertive + definitely problematic coworkers, 50.00% 
indicated becoming more assertive. Of those written to over-assertive + definitely problematic 
coworkers, 16.67% indicated becoming less assertive (X2(1,28) = 3.50, p = .06). Consistent with 
Study 1 and further supporting Hypothesis 1, under-assertive + problematic coworkers were 
more likely to receive relevant assertiveness feedback than over-assertive + problematic 
coworkers.  
 Performance compliments. Coding results also revealed that a good share of feedback 
comments contained performance compliments such as “your job performance is great” or “you 
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do a wonderful job.” In exploratory analyses, I found that among the feedback comments written 
to under-assertive + problematic coworkers, 39.13% contained a performance compliment. In 
contrast, among those written to over-assertive + problematic coworkers, 58.93% contained a 
performance compliment (X2(1,102) = 3.96, p < .01). Over-assertive + problematic coworkers 
were more likely to receive a performance compliment than under-assertive + problematic 
coworkers. 
Gender. Though I had no a priori hypotheses about gender effects, I tested for them in the 
data. Results did not differ based on target gender. The proportions of females considered under-
assertive and over-assertive by negotiation counterparts or observers did not differ from those of 
males (X2(154) = 0.02, p = .88; X2(154) = 0.25, p = .62). Furthermore, the proportions of under-
assertive and over-assertive females who were also considered problematic did not differ from 
those of males (X2(72) = 0.24, p = .62; X2(70) = 2.42, p = .12. Finally, the proportion of under-
assertive + problematic females told to be more assertive and over-assertive + problematic 
females told to be less assertive did not differ from those of males (X2(46) = 2.49, p = .11; 
X2(56) = .92, p = .34). 
Discussion 
Study 2 echoed Study 1’s support for Hypothesis 1: assertiveness feedback was 
asymmetrically transmitted. Participants were far less likely to signal assertiveness feedback to 
their over- versus under-assertive coworkers. Indeed, even among those for whom their 
assertiveness was seen as “definite” development need, only a small share (17%) of feedback 
provided for over-assertive targets called out the issue. 
Study 2’s findings built upon those of Study 1 by extending evidence of the effect to a 
population of working professionals and demonstrating its application to feedback pertaining to 
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overall job performance. Study 2 also suggests that asymmetric assertiveness feedback is not 
merely the result of asymmetric importance, given that the effect remained even after 
participants specified the significance of their coworker’s problem with assertiveness. 
Furthermore, exploratory analyses suggest that over-assertive individuals were more likely than 
under-assertive individuals to receive performance compliments, potentially leading them to 
conclude that their behavior is effective and their development needs are modest. 
Study 3a 
Results thus far bear on the transmission of feedback, supporting Hypothesis 1. Study 3 
shifted focus to Hypothesis 2, concerning individuals’ receptivity to feedback. Studies 3a and 3b 
looked specifically at what over-assertive individuals were taking away from assertiveness 
feedback when it was actually transmitted. I turned back to negotiations and “turned up the 
volume” of the feedback signal by presenting targets with a concrete number representing their 
average assertiveness level as rated by multiple counterparts over time. In Study 3a, I examined 
targets’ initial reaction to this rating and intentions for developing their assertiveness. In Study 
3b, I returned to these targets several months later for their subsequent reflections and reported 
development. 
Method 
Participants and procedure. One hundred and ten MBA students enrolled in 
negotiations courses at a United States business school responded to a paper and pencil survey in 
class. Forty (37.04 %) were female. Average age was 28.31 years (SD = 1.92). Sixty-Five 
(60.19%) identified themselves as Caucasian, 26 (24.07 %) as Asian or Asian American, 8 
(7.41%) as Latino or Hispanic, and 4 (3.70%) as African American. 
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Throughout the first four sessions of the course, targets participated in five different 
negotiation simulations similar to that described in Study 1. In each simulation, targets 
negotiated with a different classmate who then rated the target immediately afterward on a 
number of dimensions (e.g., communication effectiveness, listening, creativity, trustworthiness)8. 
Importantly, targets were rated on one behavioral dimension curvilinearly related to outcomes, 
assertiveness, using a five-point scale that included 1 (Very under-assertive), 2 (Somewhat 
under-assertive), 3 (Appropriately assertive), 4 (Somewhat over-assertive), and 5 (Very over-
assertive). In the fifth session of the course, each target received a personalized report that 
indicated how they were on average rated by all five classmates on the full survey of items. In 
the sixth session, two days later, targets completed a survey specifically regarding the 
assertiveness rating they received in this report.  
Measures  
Main takeaway. Targets were first asked to provide a free-response answer to the 
question: “After reading through your negotiation feedback report, what is your main 
takeaway?” Two independent coders read all 110 “main takeaway” responses and indicated 
whether each mentioned becoming more assertive, less assertive, or made no mention of 
assertiveness. Coders agreed on 90.91% of cases and were able to come to an agreement on those 
remaining.  
Disregard of assertiveness feedback. Targets were reminded of their average 
assertiveness rating, which was originally presented to them in the feedback report they received 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 One of the five simulations featured a negotiation observer, who rated the student a sixth time. 
Due to class absence, some students were unable to participate in every simulation, thus received 
fewer total ratings. Because the total number of students was uneven, some negotiated with 
multiple partners, thus received multiple ratings for one negotiation. Students received an 
average of 5.90 ratings (SD = 0.56) 
25	  
	  
in the previous session; surveys were personalized for each target. Targets were also reminded of 
the five-point scale used to interpret this score. Targets indicated their agreement with the 
statement “I am inclined to disregard this feedback about my assertiveness” on a seven-point 
scale ranging from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree).  
Intention to develop assertiveness. Finally, targets rated their intentions to develop their 
assertiveness in future negotiations using a five-point scale including 1 (Clearly less assertive), 2 
(Somewhat less assertive), 3 (Neither more nor less assertive), 4 (Somewhat more assertive), and 
5 (Clearly more assertive). 
Results 
In order to examine how assertiveness feedback affected targets’ survey responses, I 
categorized targets based on their average assertiveness rating. Targets (34) who received an 
average assertiveness rating of 1-2.9 were categorized as under-assertive, 3 (30) as appropriately 
assertive, and 3.1-5 (46) as over assertive9.  
Main takeaway. First, I analyzed targets’ written responses regarding their main 
takeaway. Among all targets, 42 (38.18%) cited feedback about their assertiveness as a main 
takeaway. Among under-assertive individuals, 55.88% cited assertiveness feedback. Among 
over-assertive individuals, 8.70% cited assertiveness feedback, X2 (1,80) = 21.25, p < .01. These 
results supported Hypothesis 2, suggesting that over-assertive individuals were less attentive and 
receptive to assertiveness feedback than under-assertive individuals. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 The same pattern of results emerges based on alternative categorizations of the data including 
the lowest third of assertiveness ratings: under-assertive, the highest third: over-assertive, and the 
lowest fourth: under-assertive, the highest fourth: over-assertive. 
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Disregard of feedback. Over-assertive individuals were also more likely to agree with the 
statement “I am inclined to disregard this feedback about my assertiveness” (M = 2.33, SD = 
1.19) than under-assertive individuals (M = 1.65, SD = 0.77 ; t(78) = -2.90, p < .01).  
Intention to develop. Finally, under-assertive individuals indicated that they intended to 
be more assertive in future negotiations than over-assertive individuals (4.12 vs. 3.15, t(78) = 
5.72, p < .01). Specifically, over-assertive individuals’ average response (M = 3.15, SD = .81) 
was not significantly different from 3—the scale item corresponding to “Neither more nor less 
assertive” (t(45) = 1.23, p = .23). The average intention rating of under-assertive individuals (M 
= 4.12, SD = .59) was significantly greater than 3 (t(33) = 11.03, p < .01), indicating an 
aspiration to act more assertively. As predicted by Hypothesis 2, over-assertive targets were less 
likely than under-assertive targets to indicate intent to modify their assertiveness. 
Gender. While I had no a priori predictions, I also examined gender effects. Females in 
the sample were less likely than males to be considered over-assertive (21.62% vs. 49.28%; 
X2(106) = 7.70, p = .01). No other results differed based on target gender. The proportion of 
females considered under-assertive did not differ from that of males (X2(106) = .24, p = .62). 
The proportion of under- and over-assertive females who cited assertiveness feedback as a main 
takeaway did not differ from that of males (X2(34) = 0.06, p = .80: X2 (42) = 1.52, p = .22). 
Under- and over-assertive females’ inclination to disregard did not differ from that of males 
(t(32) = 1.19, p = .24; ; t(40) = -.581, p = .57). Finally, under- and over-assertive females’ 
intention to modify their assertiveness did not differ from that of males (t(32) = -.91, p = .37; 




 Study 3a looked at initial reactions to concrete assertiveness feedback and development 
intentions. Study 3b followed up, 6 months later, with the same targets to gauge their subsequent 
reflections and ongoing development. 
Method 
Participants and procedure. Eighty-seven participants responded to an online survey 
six months after the survey in Study 3a was administered. Thirty-four (39.08%) were female. 
Average age was 28.36 years (SD = 1.88). Fifty-two (65.00%) identified themselves as 
Caucasian, 22 (27.50 %) as Asian or Asian American, 6 (7.50%) as Latino or Hispanic, and 2 
(2.50%) as African American. 
Measures  
Main takeaway. Participants were first reminded of the feedback report described in 
Study 3a which they had previously received. Then, participants were asked to provide a free 
response answer to the question: “Looking back, what is your biggest takeaway from that 
feedback?” Two independent coders read all 87 responses and indicated whether each response 
mentioned becoming more assertive, less assertive, or did not mention assertiveness at all. 
Coders agreed on 93.10% of cases and were able to come to an agreement on those remaining. 
Assessment of assertiveness development needs. Next, participants were asked: “At the 
end of the course, did you leave thinking you needed to become less assertive, more assertive, or 
maintain your level of assertiveness?” Answers were indicated on a five-point scale including 1 
(Need to become much less assertive), 2 (Need to become somewhat less assertive), 3 (Maintain 
my level of assertiveness (no change)), 4 (Need to become somewhat more assertive), and 5 
(Need to become much more assertive). 
Change in assertiveness. Finally, participants were asked: “How has your behavior 
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actually changed since the course? Have you actually become less assertive, more assertive, or 
maintained your level of assertiveness?” Answers were indicated on a five-point scale including 
1 (I have become much less assertive), 2 (I have become somewhat less assertive), 3 (I have 
maintain my level of assertiveness (no change)), 4 (I have become somewhat more assertive), 
and 5 (I have become much more assertive). 
Results 
Main takeaway. Exactly as in Study 3a, I categorized students as under- (27 total), over- 
(35 total), or appropriately assertive (25 total) based on their average assertiveness rating10. First, 
I analyzed targets’ written responses about their main takeaway. Of all targets, 37 (44.58%) 
mentioned assertiveness as a main takeaway. Among under-assertive individuals, 50.0% 
mentioned becoming more assertive. Among over-assertive individuals, 20.59% mentioned 
becoming less assertive (X2(1,60) = 5.74, p =.02). These results suggest that over-assertive 
individuals were less receptive to assertiveness feedback than under-assertive individuals, thus 
further supporting Hypothesis 2.  
Assessment of assertiveness development needs. Additionally, under-assertive 
individuals indicated that they left the course thinking they needed to become more assertive 
than did over-assertive individuals (3.93 vs. 2.94, t(60) = 4.40, p < .01). Specifically, over-
assertive individuals’ average response (M = 2.94, SD = .91) did not significantly differ from 3—
the scale item corresponding to “Maintain my level of assertiveness (no change)” (t(34) = -0.37, 
p = .71). Under-assertive individuals’ average response (M = 3.93, SD = 0.83) was significantly 
greater than 3 (t(26) = 5.81, p < .01), indicating an aspiration to act more assertively.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The same pattern of results emerges based on alternative categorizations of the data including 
the lowest third of assertiveness ratings: under-assertive, the highest third: over-assertive, and the 
lowest fourth: under-assertive, the highest fourth: over-assertive. 
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Change in assertiveness. Finally, under-assertive individuals reported that they had 
become more assertive in the intervening period than did over-assertive individuals (t(60) = 3.17, 
p < .01). Over-assertive individuals’ average response (M = 3.06, SD = .84) did not significantly 
differ from 3—the scale item corresponding to “I have maintained my level of assertiveness (no 
change)” (t(34) = -0.40, p = .69). Under-assertive individuals’ average response (M = 3.67, SD = 
0.62) was significantly greater than 3 (t(26) = 5.59, p < .01), indicating an increased level of 
assertiveness. As predicted by Hypothesis 2, over-assertive targets were less likely than under-
assertive targets to report having modified their assertiveness. 
Gender. While I had no a priori predictions, I also examined gender effects. Females in 
the sample were more likely than males to mention assertiveness as a main takeaway (51.61% of 
females vs. 29.17% of males; X2(79) = 4.03, p = .04). No other results differed based on target 
gender. The proportion of under- and over-assertive females who mentioned modifying their 
assertiveness as a main takeaway did not differ from that of males (X2(24) = 1.37, p = .24; 
X2(32) = 0.96, p = .33). Under-and over-assertive females realization of the need to modify their 
assertiveness did not differ from that of males (t(25) = -.09, p = .93; t(32) = -.74, p = .46). 
Finally, females did not report becoming more or less assertive than males (t(84) = .63, p = .53). 
Discussion 
Studies 3a and b supported Hypothesis 2. Results suggested that over-assertive 
individuals were less receptive to assertiveness feedback than under-assertive individuals. 
Compared to under-assertive individuals, over-assertive individuals were less likely to consider 
assertiveness feedback one of the main takeaways from a broader feedback report, more inclined 
to dismiss a concrete assertiveness feedback signal, and less intent on modulating their 
assertiveness. Six months later, these effects endured. Compared to under-assertive individuals, 
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over-assertive individuals were still less likely to consider assertiveness feedback one of their 
main takeaways, less likely to recall thinking that they needed to modulate their assertiveness, 
and less likely to report having actually changed. 
General Discussion 
 Almost everyone has, on occasion, pushed too hard to get their way. A noteworthy share 
of people do so with regularity, reliably leaving counterparts and observers feeling that they have 
crossed the line. Over time, the relational and instrumental costs can mount for such a pattern of 
behavior—so why are some people persistently over-assertive? Many factors are likely to be 
involved, but I focused on finding new evidence for two of them in the present paper. I expected 
that feedback signals for over-assertive people are likely to be faint. I also expected that, when 
signals are sent, over-assertive people are unlikely to accept them.  
The three studies reported here supported these hypotheses about transmission and 
acceptance. Study 1 gauged whether negotiators less often transmitted assertiveness feedback to 
their over-assertive versus under-assertive counterparts. Similarly, Study 2 captured 
comprehensive job performance feedback, testing whether employees were less likely to write to 
their over-assertive versus under-assertive coworkers with assertiveness feedback. Both studies 
revealed that feedback providers were less likely to unambiguously signal that an over- versus 
under-assertive target’s assertiveness level should be modified. Beyond finding a relative 
difference in transmission to over- versus under-assertive targets, I found markedly low absolute 
levels of transmission of critical comments about over-assertiveness. Across measures and 
samples, I found that over-assertiveness was explicitly called out in feedback to targets less than 




Turning to acceptance, Study 3a presented over- and under-assertive individuals with 
unambiguous feedback from counterparts and examined their reactions. As expected, I found that 
over-assertive targets, compared to under-assertive ones, were less likely to attend to and accept 
assertiveness feedback and attempt to modify their behavior accordingly. Six months later, these 
over-assertive targets reported less personal development than under-assertive ones. Again, not 
only did I find differences between over- and under-assertive individuals but I also found low 
absolute levels of acceptance among over-assertive individuals. Only a minority of over-assertive 
individuals (20%) identified assertiveness as a main takeaway from their feedback (less than half 
the rate of under-assertive individuals). On average, over-assertive individuals said they did not 
intend to change their behavior—and, indeed, six months later, on average, they reported no 
change (compared to under-assertive individuals who, on average, both initially intended to 
change and subsequently reporting having increased their assertiveness). 
Theoretical and Practical Implications 
In the present Chapter, I tested how differing prescriptions for behavior modification 
affect the transmission and acceptance of negative assertiveness feedback. In doing so, my work 
integrates and extends the literatures on feedback and assertiveness. By exploring the 
intersection of these two literatures, I was able to identify a double failure in the communication 
of assertiveness feedback as the culprit of persistent over-assertiveness.  I contribute to the 
feedback literature by distinguishing between feedback that directs a target to increase versus 
decrease a behavioral quality. To my knowledge, mine is the first to do so. Prior work considers 
feedback valence, but makes no distinction based on the direction of development needs. Here, I 
account for the difference in direction and, in doing so, help clarify some inconsistencies in past 
work on the effects of negative versus positive feedback (Kluger & Denisi, 1996). I find that not 
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“all bad news” is the same. Rather, the kind of bad news—the particular direction of the 
feedback—impacts its transmission and acceptance. Additionally, I contribute to the 
assertiveness literature by initiating an investigation of assertiveness feedback. My results 
provide insight into the manifestation and persistence of over-assertiveness, which past work has 
established as a common and problematic syndrome (Ames & Wazlawek, 2014). Practically, I 
demonstrate that the issue of over-assertiveness may be resistant to feedback and special 
treatment may be necessary to achieve behavior modification. 
Beyond Assertiveness 
In this Chapter, I have identified a double failure in the communication of feedback to 
over-assertive individuals. In the next Chapter, I build upon these findings in several important 
ways. I delve deeper into the feedback literature, grounding the work in scholarship on 
development dynamics and considering the findings from this perspective. There is potential for 
this work to have a broader impact, not only on feedback pertaining to assertiveness but also on 
feedback in general. Motivated by the need for research on variables that explain the ambiguous 
results of past work on the negative feedback-behavioral response link, I explore whether the 
asymmetric transmission and acceptance of feedback in general depends on development 
direction. Chapter II provides additional data and further analyses of feedback pertaining to a 
wider set of behavioral dimensions. In order to determine whether the effect is unique to 
assertiveness, I test for asymmetries in the transmission and acceptance of feedback about 
receptivity, relationship focus, delegation, and decision analysis behavior.   
In justifying the expanded hypotheses in Chapter II, I draw heavily on Kluger and 
DeNisi’s (1996) Feedback Intervention Theory, utilizing it as a lens through which to examine 
the contrast between feedback of opposing development directions. Specifically, FIT asserts that 
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task-focused feedback featuring specific guidance on how to improve and containing the correct 
solution is most successful at impacting positive behavioral change. Otherwise, feedback may 
elicit rejection of the feedback. I claim that these characteristics typify feedback of the “increase” 
direction more so than feedback of the “decrease” direction. Therefore, feedback of the 
“increase” (vs. “decrease”) direction is more likely to improve performance and less likely to be 
rejected. Furthermore, I integrate FIT with past work suggesting that feedback providers’ 
expectancy of targets’ behavioral change may influence their act of transmitting (Fischer, 1979; 
Ilgen, Fischer, & Taylor, 1979; Smither, London, & Reilly, 2005). Thus, the tendency of targets 
to reject feedback of the “decrease” direction may deter feedback providers from ever 
transmitting it. Finally, I test two proposed mechanisms for the asymmetric transmission effect. 
First I consider differences in the valence of feedback of opposing development directions. 
Second, I consider a difference in providers’ expectation that their feedback will effect 



















Chapter II: Beyond Assertiveness: Development Direction Predicts Asymmetric Transmission 
and Acceptance of Feedback Pertaining to Other Behavioral dimensions 
 
Organizations routinely cultivate a steady supply of performance feedback for 
employees. Sometimes, this exchange of feedback results in positive behavioral change, yet past 
work suggests that null effects, or even harmful effects, emerge with considerable frequency. 
(Bangert-Drowns, Kulik, & Morgan, 1991; Hattie & Timperley, 2007; Kluger & DeNisi, 1996). 
In light of this, numerous scholars have called for additional research and theorizing that can 
shed light on the conditions that lead to benefits versus null effects or harm (e.g., Audia & Loke, 
2003; Ilgen, Fisher, & Taylor, 1979; Kluger & DeNisi, 1996). I propose development direction 
of feedback as a new answer to these calls. Evidence presented in Chapter I indicates that 
development direction of assertiveness feedback may influence its effectiveness. Here, I examine 
whether development direction has a broader impact on feedback dimensions other than 
assertiveness. 
Performance feedback often attempts to highlight, for the recipient, the gaps between 
actual and ideal behavior. Such gaps are commonly regarded as areas where performance is 
deficient, lacking, or not enough. Yet, individuals sometimes miss the mark in the opposite 
direction. As I illustrated using the behavioral dimension of assertiveness in Chapter I, those who 
fail to successfully meet a behavioral standard could not only fall short, but instead go 
overboard. Assertiveness, as well as other certain behavioral dimensions have a curvilinear 
effect on outcomes: individuals can exhibit too much or too little of a given quality. For instance, 
one may over-analyze or under-analyze decisions, delegate too many tasks or too few. 
Accordingly, performance feedback pertaining to dimensions of this kind may indicate more 
than one developmental direction, advising a feedback recipient that their behavior is either 
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under an ideal level and should be increased or heightened or that it is over an ideal level and 
should be decreased or diminished. 
I suspect that these two different directions of negative feedback (not only “be more 
assertive” versus “be less assertive” but, more generally, "do more" versus "do less") are notably 
different and induce distinct susceptibilities to communication failure. Seminal work on feedback 
communication focuses on dynamics around feedback acceptance (or lack thereof; e.g. Ilgen, 
Fisher, & Taylor 1979). The limited work on feedback transmission shows that feedback 
providers are often reluctant to transmit negative feedback (e.g., Tesser & Rosen, 1975) and that 
transmission is often rushed, delayed, or avoided altogether (Kopelman, 1986; Meyer, 1991). 
Yet, past work has not distinguished between feedback content that is more or less likely to be 
transmitted. Prevailing accounts treat all negative feedback the same, regardless of its substance 
(e.g. Kluger & Denisi, 1996). My claim stands in contrast, arguing that within the category of 
negative feedback exist differences in content that affect communication.  
My arguments here are similar to but broader than those in Chapter I. I argue, first, that 
feedback providers may be especially unlikely or reluctant to transmit explicit feedback advising 
a decrease ("do less") in behavior compared to an increase ("do more"). Second, I argue that 
feedback recipients may be especially unwilling to accept feedback that encourages them "do 
less" compared to feedback that urges them to "do more."  
Feedback Intervention Theory and Development Direction 
 In an important review of the literature, Kluger and DeNisi (1996) showed that the 
impact of feedback on behavioral change is highly variable. Their seminal work was mentioned 
in Chapter I but I provide a deeper look here. Results of their meta-analysis revealed that 
although it is usually effective, feedback fails to improve behavior in many cases. These 
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inconsistent results suggest that a complex set of factors moderate the relationship between 
feedback and behavioral change. Feedback intervention theory serves as a framework for 
examining these processes. According to the theory, individuals are motivated to reduce 
discrepancies between their performance and set standards. Negative feedback sign indicates a 
discrepancy and, as stated in the theory, is therefore likely to induce behavioral change. Yet, 
contrary to the theory, the results of Kluger and DeNisi’s (1996) meta-analysis revealed that 
feedback sign did not significantly moderate the effect of feedback on performance. In light of 
these non-significant results, Kluger and DeNisi (1996) called for further investigation of critical 
moderators that determine the impact of feedback sign on performance—I propose feedback 
direction as one such moderator, not only as it pertains to assertiveness feedback, but other 
behavioral dimensions as well.  
 Feedback intervention theory proposes that certain characteristics of feedback impact 
how it affects performance. I claim that the two different directions of negative feedback vary on 
these characteristics. Specifically, the theory asserts that task-focused feedback featuring specific 
guidance on how to improve and containing the correct solution is most successful at impacting 
positive behavioral change. Feedback lacking such qualities may elicit rejection. I contend that 
these characteristics typify feedback of the “increase” direction more so than feedback of the 
“decrease” direction. The correct solution is inherent in feedback that directs the target to “do 
more.” Feedback that directs the target to “do less,” on the other hand, may not specify what 
behaviors should be enacted, simply proscribing a certain approach, behavior, or style. Puzzled 
about how to go about changing, feedback recipients may lose confidence in their ability to 
achieve the standard and reject the feedback instead (Kluger & DeNisi, 1996). Even if feedback 
recipients believe they ought to accept the recommendation and change their behavior, 
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uncertainty about attaining that change may prevent them from even trying (Smither, London, & 
Reilly, 2005). Accordingly, I predict that feedback recipients are more likely to reject feedback 
that recommends a decrease, versus increase, in behavior. 
This tendency to reject feedback of the “decrease” direction, may not only keep feedback 
recipients from accepting it, but also keep potential feedback providers from transmitting it. In 
their 1979 review of literature pertaining to feedback, Ilgen, Fischer, and Taylor highlighted that 
an individual’s motivation to act depends on their confidence in the utility of that act, suggesting 
that potential feedback providers may be reluctant to transmitting feedback when they believe 
that the target is unlikely to change. Indeed, past work indicates that feedback providers’ 
expectations about the subsequent influence of their feedback can affect their transmission of 
that feedback (Fisher, 1979).  
Thus, I claim that two different types of feedback, those prescribing different directions 
for behavior modification, differ in effectiveness. Expanding on Hypotheses 1 and 2 from 
Chapter I, I expect that feedback to "do more" (for those too low on a given dimension) will be 
more likely to be shared and acted up than feedback to "do less" (for those too high on a given 
dimension). 
Hypothesis 3: Feedback will be asymmetrically transmitted such that providers will 
 be significantly less likely to transmit feedback directing targets to decrease versus 
 increase their behavior. 
 Hypothesis 4: Feedback will be asymmetrically accepted such that individuals 
 receiving feedback indicating they should decrease behavior will be significantly less 
 likely to accept such feedback than individuals receiving feedback indicating they should 
 increase behavior. 
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Overview of Research 
 I tested these hypotheses in a series of studies that include new data as well as new 
analyses of data from Chapter I. Revisiting the data from Study 1, I conducted supplemental 
analyses to assess asymmetric transmission of feedback pertaining to behavioral dimensions 
beyond assertiveness, including receptivity and relationship focus. Next, I analyzed archival data 
from a multi-rater survey on leadership effectiveness. Here, I focused on feedback shared with 
over-analyzers versus under-analyzers (Study 4). Revisiting the data from Study 2, I focused on 
the behavioral dimensions of delegation and receptivity, considering two potential mechanisms 
for the asymmetric transmission effect. Finally, revisiting the data from Study 3, I analyzed what 
participants reported as their main takeaways from a larger body of feedback to see if targets 
were attending more to feedback indicating they needed to increase or decrease specific 
behaviors. 
 These additional arguments and evidence make several contributions. First, I respond to 
numerous scholarly requests for research that clarifies the inconsistent effects of feedback 
intervention (e.g., Bangert-Drowns, Kulik, & Morgan, 1991; Hattie & Timperley, 2007; Ilgen, 
Fisher, & Taylor, 1979). Because feedback processes are widely utilized by organizations with 
the worthy intention of honing employee performance, it is important to continue sharpening the 
effectiveness of this sometimes-blunt tool. My work serves this objective, pointing out areas for 
improvement in the feedback process and clarifying ambiguous past results. Specifically, I 
address Kluger and DeNisi’s (1996) surprising finding that feedback sign insignificantly affects 
behavioral response. I pose development direction as a moderator, which may help clarify their 
nonsignificant results and explain feedback communication failures across behavioral 
dimensions beyond assertiveness. Finally, my deeper investigation of this previously unexplored 
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moderator extends the feedback literature, exploring whether models of feedback transmission 
and acceptance may need to account for development direction. 
Study 1 Revisited 
 Study 1 utilized assertiveness as a theoretical example of a behavioral dimension that 
individuals can exhibit either too much of or too little of. As a reminder, I measured whether 
assertiveness feedback was less often transmitted to targets seen as over-assertive versus under-
assertive. Masters of Business Administration (MBA) students first engaged in a roleplay 
negotiation. Afterward, they privately rated whether they saw their counterpart as under- or over-
assertive and wrote to them with qualitative feedback. A separate sample of online adults 
(judges) was then asked to indicate whether this qualitative feedback signaled anything about 
assertiveness. My central question was: could the judges, based on the qualitative feedback 
transmitted to the target, sense whether the feedback provider saw the target as under- or over-
assertive? Results supported Hypothesis 1, showing that judges detected fewer signals of over-
assertiveness than under-assertiveness in the feedback. In addition to feedback written by 
negotiators to one another, feedback written by neutral observers of the negotiation was also 
gathered and revealed similar results in support of Hypothesis 1. Broadening my scope beyond 
assertiveness feedback in Chapter II, I aimed to gauge whether feedback pertaining to other 
dimensions was transmitted asymmetrically according to development direction. Revisiting the 
data from Study 1, I performed supplemental analyses to gauge for the asymmetric transmission 
of other behavioral dimensions according to development direction.  
Method 




 Asymmetric transmission of feedback pertaining to behavioral dimensions beyond 
assertiveness. My main focus in Study 1 was on assertiveness. Though assertiveness serves as a 
theoretical example of a behavioral dimension curvilinearily related to outcomes, my broader 
interests, include asymmetry in feedback pertaining to the wider set of behavioral dimensions 
that an individual can exhibit too much of, or too little of (e.g. one may be overly receptive to 
others’ input or not receptive enough; exhibit too much focus on relationships or too little). Thus, 
I returned to the feedback comments to see if providers were writing feedback about other such 
dimensions. Moreover, I examined the development direction of the feedback—whether it 
indicated that the target was “over” or “under” on the specific dimension. 
Two independent coders read all 300 feedback comments and marked whether each 
mentioned a behavioral dimension curvilinearly related to outcomes and, if so, whether the 
development direction was to increase or decrease the behavior. Coders agreed on 86.33% of 
cases and were able to come to an agreement on those remaining. I had no a priori expectations 
about what behavioral dimensions feedback providers might have commented on in their 
feedback. Instead, I performed a post hoc sorting of comments into broader categories. Results 
indicated that 12.33% (n = 37) of comments mentioned receptivity (e.g., “be more receptive”, 
“ask fewer questions”), 7.33% (n = 22) of comments mentioned relationship focus (e.g., “focus 
on relationship building”, “too friendly”), and 10.67% (n = 32) mentioned a miscellaneous 
dimension curvilinearily related to outcomes (e.g., “prepare more”, “be less animated”).  
Of the 37 comments mentioning receptivity, 97.30% (n = 36) indicated that the target 
should be more receptive and 2.7% (n = 1) indicated that the target should be less receptive. Of 
the 22 comments mentioning relationship focus, 90.91% (n = 20) indicated that the target should 
be more relationship focused and 9.09% (n = 2) indicated that the target should be less 
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relationship focused. Of the 32 comments mentioning a miscellaneous dimension curvilinearily 
related to outcomes, 65.63% (n = 21) indicated that the target should increase the behavior and 
34.38% (n = 11) indicated that the target should decrease the behavior.   
Discussion 
 Results showed support for Hypotheses 3, suggesting that feedback pertaining to 
behavioral dimensions that have a curvilinear relationship with outcomes is transmitted 
asymmetrically. Transmission depends on development direction such that individuals exhibiting 
too much of a specific behavior are far less likely to receive feedback than those exhibiting too 
little. In Study 1 I tested Hypothesis 1 by using assertiveness as a theoretical example of a 
behavioral dimension that individuals can exhibit either too much of or too little of. I found that 
feedback written to over-assertive versus under-assertive individuals was less likely to signal that 
the target should be more appropriately assertive. That is, under-assertive individuals were more 
often told to be more assertive than over-assertive individuals were told to be less assertive.  
 Further analyses suggested that asymmetric transmission is not unique to the dimension 
of assertiveness. Overall, the feedback comments analyzed in Study 1 Revisited contained 189 
mentions of a behavior that individuals can exhibit either too much of or too little of. Of those 
189 mentions, 76.19% (n = 144) indicated that the target should increase the behavior and 
14.81% (n = 28) indicated that the target should decrease the behavior.  
Because my focus in Study 1 was on assertiveness, I only collected feedback providers’ 
private ratings of targets’ assertiveness. Thus, when revisiting the data from Study 1 I was unable 
to compare feedback providers’ actual perceptions of targets’ behavior with the messages 
feedback providers chose to transmit. Thus, it is possible that this apparent asymmetry in the 
transmission of feedback pertaining to dimensions other than assertiveness was due to an actual 
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asymmetry in development direction needs (e.g., my sample of feedback may have contained 
more comments signaling that targets should increase vs. decrease their receptivity because there 
were actually more under-receptive vs. over-receptive targets). When revisiting the data from 
Study 2, I was able to improve upon this and other aspects of my Study 1 design. 
Next, in Study 4, I sought to test for asymmetric transmission in a new feedback context, 
utilizing a new dimension as theoretical example of a behavior that that individuals can exhibit 
either too much of or too little of. 
Study 4 
 In Study 4, I analyzed archival multi-rater data, again with the aim of gauging whether 
feedback is transmitted asymmetrically according to development direction. Here, I utilized the 
extent to which individuals analyze decisions as a theoretical example of a behavioral dimension 
that individuals can exhibit either too much of or too little of. Specifically I measured whether 
feedback was less often transmitted to targets seen as over-analyzers versus under-analyzers. The 
previous study focused on a single, well-defined episode, however here I shifted to capture more 
comprehensive feedback pertaining to leadership effectiveness. Working professionals enrolled 
in leadership courses invited several informants who knew them well to provide feedback about 
the target’s leadership abilities. Informants rated whether they saw the target as someone who 
under- or over-analyzes decisions and wrote to them with qualitative feedback. As outlined in 
Hypothesis 3, I expected more feedback about under-analyzing versus over-analyzing. 
Method 
 Participants and procedure. One hundred working professionals enrolled in an 
executive education class pertaining to leadership recruited a number of coworkers and fellow 
students to respond to a survey. The survey posed questions about a wide range of items 
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designed to assess behaviors relevant to leadership. The purpose of the survey was to provide 
targets (those enrolled in the course) with feedback on their effectiveness as leaders. Targets 
provided contact information for several coworkers and fellow students who then received a link 
to the online survey via email. Survey respondents were assured that their responses would 
remain anonymous. Of these 100 targets, 67.00% were male. The vast majority (62.00%) 
identified themselves as Caucasian, 15.00% as East Asian, 5.00% as African American, 8.00% 
as Hispanic/Latino, 5.00% as “other”, and 5.00% declined to answer. Average age was 28.75 
(SD = 2.66). Survey respondent demographic information was not collected. 
Measures 
 Decision analysis. Survey respondents answered two separate questions evaluating 
targets’ decision analysis behavior. They rated both the extent to which the target over-analyzes 
decisions, “spending too much time thinking rather than acting” and the extent to which the 
target under-analyzes decisions, “rushing to judgment rather than carefully weighing the 
consequences of various possible actions” using a scale from 1 (Never) to 7 (Always). I 
combined these two items to form one bipolar scale by subtracting the under-analyzing item 
from the over-analyzing item. Thus, a score of -7 represented the highest possible under-
analyzing score and a score of 7 represented the highest possible over-analyzing score. I 
excluded from analyses all raters who indicated they were not sufficiently familiar with the target 
as well as all targets who did not receive at least 3 ratings. To determine reliability in collapsing 
across raters to the target level, I computed the Intraclass Correlation Coefficient 2 measure 
(Bartko, 1976), which yielded a value of .76. 
Feedback. Survey respondents were also asked to write a few sentences regarding the 
target’s areas for improvement. The 100-target sample on which I conduced the analysis was 
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drawn from a much larger sample of 1, 215 targets. I obtained the 100 target sample by randomly 
selecting 50 targets from the set of targets with the highest 25% of decision analysis scores 
(over-analyzers) and 50 targets from the set of targets with the lowest 25% of decision analysis 
scores (under-analyzers). Data was missing for four of these targets. Two independent coders 
read the feedback written to 40 targets and indicated whether each mentioned decision analysis 
behavior, and if so whether the development direction was to increase (e.g., “often fails to 
analyze the situation and the facts”) or decrease (e.g., “overanalyzes issues”) the behavior. 
Coders agreed on 87.50% of cases. One coder evaluated the feedback written to the remaining 60 
targets. 
Results 
 Of the under-analysers in my sample, 96.00% (48) received feedback from one or more 
respondents indicating that they should increase their decision analysis behavior. Of the over-
analyzers in my sample, 67.39% (31) received feedback from one or more respondents indicating 
that they should decrease their decision analysis behavior (X2 (1, 96) = 13.46, p < 0.01). Under-
analyzers were told to increase their decision analysis behavior by an average of 2.69 (SD = 
1.70) different raters and over-analyzers were told to decrease their behavior by an average of 
1.20 (SD = 1.20) different raters (t(95) = 4.93, p < .01) . 
Gender. Though I had no a priori hypotheses about gender effects, I tested for them in 
my data. Results did not differ based on target gender. The proportions of females considered 
under-analyzers and over-analyzers did not differ from those of males (X2 (1, 97) = 0.11, p = 
.74). Furthermore, the proportion of female under-analyzers told to increase their decision 
analysis behavior and female over-analyzers told to decrease their decision analysis behavior did 




 Study 4 showed further support for Hypothesis 3, suggesting that feedback pertaining to 
behavioral dimensions that individuals can exhibit either too much of or too little of is 
transmitted asymmetrically according to development direction. As a theoretical example of such 
a behavior, I employed the extent to which individuals analyze decisions. I found that informants 
transmitted more feedback about under-analyzing than over-analyzing. These findings extend 
evidence of the asymmetric transmission effect to a population of working professionals and 
demonstrate its application to feedback pertaining to leadership effectiveness. 
 Next, I revisited the data from Study 2, improving upon the design of Study 1 Revisited 
and Study 4 by captured feedback providers’ perception of targets’ performance on multiple 
behavioral dimensions before they wrote feedback.  
Study 2 Revisited 
 Study 2 captured job performance feedback, examining the asymmetric signaling effect 
with a distinct sample of working professionals. As a reminder, results revealed that participants 
were less likely to transmit assertiveness feedback to their over- versus under-assertive 
coworkers, even those coworkers for whom participants recognized that assertiveness was a 
problematic issue that required development. I expand analysis of these data here, assessing 
feedback pertaining to receptivity, and delegation, in addition to assertiveness. I examine 
feedback providers’ perceptions of targets’ performance on all three behavioral dimensions as 
well as qualitative feedback. 
 Additionally, I considered two potential mechanisms for the asymmetric transmission 
effect: first, a difference in the valence of feedback of opposing development directions and, 
second, a difference in providers’ expectation that their feedback will effect behavioral change in 
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targets with opposing directions of developmental needs. I evaluate each with a set of follow up 
questions posed to feedback providers about their anticipated experience of delivering feedback. 
Method 
Participants and procedure were identical to those of Study 2.   
Measures 
 Measures were identical to those of Study 2, however I have reiterated them here in order 
to represent the expanded set of relevant items. Participants evaluated each coworker on several 
performance dimensions. Only measures of behavioral dimensions curvilinearly related to 
outcomes were pertinent to my investigation, but other measures (e.g., time management, 
communication) were included as filler items. Participants then wrote performance feedback to 
one coworker and, finally, answered follow up questions pertaining to potential mechanisms 
behind the asymmetric transmission effect. 
 Coworker delegation. Participants were asked to evaluate each coworker’s delegation 
behavior using a five-point scale that included 1 (Delegates extremely too little), 2 (Delegates 
somewhat too little), 3 (Delegates an appropriate amount), 4 (Delegates somewhat too much), 
and 5 (Delegates extremely too much). 
 Coworker receptivity. Participants were asked to evaluate each coworker’s receptivity 
using a five-point scale that included 1 (Extremely too receptive), 2 (Somewhat too receptive), 3 
(Appropriately receptive), 4 (Somewhat too receptive), and 5 (Extremely too receptive). 
Coworker assertiveness. Participants were asked to evaluate each coworker’s 
assertiveness using a five-point scale that included 1 (Very under-assertive), 2 (Somewhat under-
assertive), 3 (Appropriately assertive), 4 (Somewhat over-assertive), and 5 (Very over-assertive). 
Importance of development. For each behavioral dimension, participants also indicated 
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the extent to which each coworker’s level of that behavior was a problem that necessitated 
development using a three-point scale including 1 (Not really a problem, development is not 
needed), 2 (Somewhat of a problem, development is somewhat needed), and 3 (Definitely a 
problem, development is definitely needed). 
Feedback. Finally, participants were told to imagine they had been asked to provide 
feedback for a coworker as part of a new performance feedback program being implemented at 
their workplace. Participants were encouraged to consider the coworker’s performance and 
behavior at work and comment on weaknesses they should modify and strengths they should 
reinforce. Participants were further instructed to imagine that this feedback would actually be 
sent to their coworker via email. To limit survey fatigue, feedback was requested for only one of 
the three coworkers evaluated. Two independent coders read all 154 coworker feedback 
comments and indicated whether each mentioned delegation, receptivity, or assertiveness, and if 
so whether the development direction was to increase or decrease the behavior. Coders agreed on 
88.31% of cases and were able to come to an agreement on those remaining. 
Potential mechanisms. Finally, I asked participants to indicate their responses to multiple 
questions about what it would be like to actually deliver feedback to their coworker on a five-
point scale that included 1 (Not at all), 2 (Slightly, a little), 3 (Moderately, somewhat), 4 (Mostly, 
to a good degree), and 5 (Extremely, a lot). Using these questions, I created two scales. The first 
scale pertained to feedback valence. Items included “giving this person feedback about their 
behavior would harm our relationship”, “I might offend this person by giving them feedback 
about their behavior”, and “This person might react negatively to feedback about their behavior” 
(α = .92). The second scale pertained to the likelihood of effecting behavioral change. Items 
included “This person cares about improving their performance”, “Giving this person feedback 
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might help them change and improve”, and “This person might dismiss feedback” (α = .78).  
Results 
 Feedback signal. I first examined whether participants were less likely to transmit 
feedback indicating one development direction versus another. To do this, I categorized 
coworkers based on participants’ rating of their behavior level and the extent to which it was a 
problem that required development. First, I collapsed the five-point behavioral perception scales 
to three levels representing under (1 or 2), appropriate (3), and over (4 or 5). Next I collapsed the 
three-point need for development scale down to two levels representing either that the 
coworker’s behavior was not a problem and did not require development (1), or that it was a 
problem and did require development (2 or 3). For each behavioral dimension (delegation, 
receptivity, and assertiveness) I crossed these two collapsed scales, creating six categories. For 
delegation feedback, my two main categories of comparison were the 49 (33.79%) under-
delegating individuals whose under-delegating behavior was considered a problem requiring 
development and the 39 (26.90%) over-delegating individuals whose over-delegating behavior 
was considered a problem requiring development. For receptivity feedback, my two main 
categories of comparison were the 50 (34.48)% under-receptive individuals whose under-
receptivity was considered a problem requiring development and the 13 (8.97)% over-receptive 
whose over-receptivity was considered a problem requiring development. For assertiveness 
feedback, my two main categories of comparison were the 46 (29.87%) under-assertive 
coworkers whose under-assertiveness was considered a problem requiring development and the 
56 (36.36%) over-assertive coworkers whose over-assertiveness was considered a problem 
requiring development. 
 Of the feedback written to under-delegating + problematic coworkers, 28.57% indicated 
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delegating more. Of the feedback written to over-delegating + problematic coworkers, 7.69% 
indicated delegating less (X2 (1, 88) = 6.07, p < 0.01). Of the feedback written to under-receptive 
+ problematic coworkers, 24.00% indicated being more receptive. Of feedback written to over-
receptive + problematic coworkers, 0% indicated being less receptive (X2 (1, 63) = 3.85, p = 
0.05). Of the feedback comments written to under-assertive + problematic coworkers, 39.13% 
indicated becoming more assertive. Of those written to over-assertive + problematic coworkers, 
10.71% indicated becoming less assertive (X2 (1, 102) = 11.33, p < .01). Consistent with Studies 
1 and 2 and further supporting Hypothesis 1, feedback was transmitted asymmetrically according 
to development direction. More feedback was transmitted to coworkers perceived as needing to 
increase versus decrease a behavior.  
 Mechanisms. Participants indicated that over-delegating coworkers would be no more 
offended by relevant feedback (M = 2.36, SD = .81) than under-delegating coworkers (M = 2.62, 
SD = 1.25; t(57) = .64, p = .52). However, participants indicated that over-delegating coworkers 
would be less likely to change their behavior (M = 2.44, SD = .91) than under-delegating 
coworkers (M = 2.87, SD = .61; t(57) = 2.03, p = .05). Participants indicated that over-receptive 
coworkers would be no more offended by relevant feedback (M = 2.87, SD = .78) than under-
receptive coworkers (M = 3.22, SD = 1.18; t(61) = 1.00, p = .32). Participants also indicated that 
over-receptive coworkers would be no more likely to change their behavior (M = 2.74, SD = .76) 
than under-receptive coworkers (M = 2.80, SD = .88; t(61) = .21, p = .83). Participants indicated 
that over-assertive coworkers would be more offended by relevant feedback (M = 3.13, SD = 
1.19) than under-assertive coworkers (M = 2.43, SD = 1.24; t(100) = -2.86, p < .01). Participants 
also indicated that over-assertive coworkers would be less likely to change their behavior (M = 
2.66, SD = .75) than under-assertive coworkers (M = 3.14, SD = .87; t(100) = 2.98, p <. 01). 
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Gender. Though I had no a priori hypotheses about gender effects, I tested for them in the 
data. Males were more likely to be considered over-delegators than females (X2 (1, 154) = 3.78, 
p = .05). No other results differed based on target gender. The proportions of females considered 
under-receptive, over-receptive, under-delegating, under-assertive and over-assertive did not 
differ from those of males (X2 (1, 154) = 0.03, p = .87; X2 (1, 154) = 0.00, p = .95; X2 (1, 154) = 
0.21, p = .65; X2 (1, 154) = 0.02, p = .88; X2 (1, 154) = 0.25, p = .62). Furthermore, the 
proportions of under-receptive, over-receptive, under-delegating, over-delegating, under-
assertive and over-assertive females who were also considered problematic did not differ from 
those of males (X2 (1, 78) = .41, p = .52; X2 (1, 20) = .22, p = .64; X2 (1, 48) = 1.37, p = .24; X2 
(1, 39) = 0.20, p = .66; X2 (1, 72) = 0.24, p = .62; X2 (1, 70) = 2.42, p = .12. Finally, the 
proportion of under-receptive + problematic, over-receptive + problematic, under-delegating + 
problematic, over-delegating + problematic, under- assertive + problematic, and over-assertive + 
problematic females given pertinent feedback did not differ from those of males (X2 (1, 50) = 
.53, p = .47; chi-squared test not possible because no over-receptive individuals received 
feedback; X2 (1, 25) = 2.23, p = .14; X2 (1, 32) = 1.2, p = .27; X2 (1, 46) = 2.49, p = .11; X2 (1, 
56) = .92, p = .34).  
Discussion 
Study 2 Revisited echoed support for Hypothesis 3: feedback pertaining to behavioral 
dimensions that individuals can exhibit either too much of or too little of is asymmetrically 
transmitted according to development direction. Participants were less likely to signal pertinent 
feedback to their over-receptive, over-delegating, and over-assertive coworkers than their under-
receptive, under-delegating, and under-assertive coworkers, respectively. This deeper exploration 
of the data in Study 2 extends evidence of the asymmetric transmission effect to the behavioral 
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dimensions of receptivity and delegation. Again, asymmetric transmission is not merely the 
result of asymmetric importance, given that the effect remained even after participants specified 
the significance of their coworker’s problematic behavior. Furthermore, in determining what 
mechanisms explain the asymmetric transmission effect, Study 2 Revisited findings point most 
strongly to the anticipated likelihood of the feedback effecting behavioral change. Results 
indicate that this mechanism plays a role in the asymmetric transmission of both assertiveness 
and delegation feedback. Predictably, receptivity feedback falls outside the boundary of this 
mechanism’s influence. It is contradictory to assume that a target errant of being overly receptive 
to other’s suggestions would be likely to resist feedback proposing a behavioral change. Broadly, 
these findings reveal that different or multiple mechanisms may be operating behind the 
asymmetric transmission effect as it pertains to different behavioral dimensions. 
Study 3 Revisited 
Study 3a shifted focus to individual’s receptivity to feedback. As a reminder, I looked 
specifically at what over-assertive individuals were taking away from assertiveness feedback 
when it was actually transmitted. I presented targets with a concrete number representing their 
average assertiveness level as rated by multiple counterparts over time. I found that over-
assertive target were more likely than under-assertive targets to reject this rating and indicate no 
intention to develop. Here, I revisit these data in order to gauge asymmetric acceptance of other 
behavioral dimensions. 
Method 
 Participants, procedure and measures were identical to Study 3a. 
Results 
Asymmetric acceptance of feedback pertaining to behavioral dimensions beyond 
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assertiveness. In this Study I employed the behavioral dimension of assertiveness as a theoretical 
example for testing my hypothesis about asymmetry in feedback acceptance, given its relevance 
to the negotiation context. My broader interests, however, include asymmetry in feedback 
pertaining to the wider set of behavioral dimensions that an individual can exhibit too much of, 
or too little of. Thus, I returned to the main takeaway responses to see if targets mentioned other 
such dimensions. Moreover, I examined the development direction of their cited main 
takeaway—whether the target indicated that he or she needed to increase or decrease the specific 
behavior. 
Two independent coders read all 110 responses and marked whether each mentioned a 
behavioral dimension curvilinearly related to outcomes and, if so, whether the development 
direction was to increase or decrease the behavior. Coders agreed on 87.27% of cases and were 
able to come to an agreement on those remaining. I had no a priori expectations about what 
targets might have cited as their main takeaways. Instead, I performed a post hoc sorting of 
comments into broader categories. Results indicated that 9.09% (n = 10) of responses mentioned 
receptivity (e.g., “listen to others”, “ask fewer questions”), 12.73% (n = 14) of comments 
mentioned relationship focus (e.g., “be friendlier”, “less robotic”), and 21.82% (n = 24) 
mentioned a miscellaneous dimension curvilinearily related to outcomes (e.g., “more 
expressive”, “less detail oriented”).  
Of the 10 comments mentioning receptivity, 90.00% (n = 9) indicated that the target 
should be more receptive and 10% (n = 1) indicated that the target should be less receptive. Of 
the 14 comments mentioning relationship focus, 78.57% (n = 11) indicated that the target should 
be more relationship focused and 21.43% (n = 3) indicated that the target should be less 
relationship focused. Of the 24 comments mentioning a miscellaneous dimension curvilinearily 
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related to outcomes, 41.67% (n = 10) indicated that the target should increase the behavior and 
58.33% (n = 14) indicated that the target should decrease the behavior. 
Gender. While I had no a priori predictions, I also examined gender effects. Females in the 
sample were less likely than males to be considered over-assertive (21.62% vs. 49.28%; X2 (1, 
106) = 7.70, p = .01). Additionally, females rated females (M = 2.85 SD = .52) marginally less 
assertive than males rated females (M = 3.03 SD = .72; t(186) = -1.84, p = .07). No other results 
differed based on target gender. The proportion of females considered under-assertive did not 
differ from that of males (X2 (1, 106) = .24, p = .62). Under- and over-assertive females’ 
inclination to disregard did not differ from that of males (t(32) = 1.19, p = .24; ; t(40) = -.581, p 
= .57). Finally, under- and over-assertive females’ intention to modify their assertiveness did not 
differ from that of males (t(32) = -.91, p = .37;t(40) = .76, p = .45). 
Discussion 
 Study 3 Revisited supported Hypotheses 4. Results suggested that feedback is accepted 
asymmetrically such that individuals who receive feedback indicating that they need to decrease 
versus increase a behavior are less receptive to that feedback. Results suggest that, in general, 
individuals attend more to behaviors they need to increase when reflecting on key takeaways 




Chapter III: The Case for Development Direction: A Discussion of Findings 
  
Feedback processes are standard practice in most workplaces, yet the results are far from 
perfect. Prior research has demonstrated that feedback is often an ineffectual means to improving 
performance. Evidence presented in Chapters I and II suggests that development direction may 
partially account for feedback effectiveness. Results indicate that feedback is asymmetrically 
transmitted and accepted such that providers are less likely to transmit and recipients are less 
likely to accept feedback directing a decrease versus increase in behavior. 
Summary of results 
Chapter I presented three studies revolving specifically around the transmission and 
acceptance of assertiveness feedback. Study 1 examined whether negotiators less often 
transmitted assertiveness feedback to their over-assertive versus under-assertive counterparts. 
Study 2 also focused on feedback transmission, testing whether employees were less likely to 
write to their over-assertive versus under-assertive coworkers with assertiveness feedback as part 
of a simulated comprehensive job performance feedback exercise. Both studies indicated that 
feedback providers were less likely to encourage over- versus under-assertive targets to modify 
their assertiveness level.  
Study 3 shifted focus to feedback acceptance, presenting over- and under-assertive 
individuals with concrete, numerical feedback from counterparts and examined their reactions. 
As expected, over-assertive targets, compared to under-assertive ones, were less likely to attend 
to and accept assertiveness feedback and attempt to modify their behavior accordingly. Six 
months later, these over-assertive targets reported less personal development.  
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Moving beyond assertiveness in Chapter II, I expected to find that the same asymmetric 
effects would generally apply to feedback pertaining to behavioral dimensions curvilinearly 
related to outcomes. That is, feedback providers would be less likely to encourage targets to “do 
less” versus “do more” and recipients would be less willing to accept feedback prescribing a 
decrease versus increase in behavior.  
Evidence presented in Chapter II supported these hypotheses concerning feedback 
transmission and acceptance. Results suggested that the asymmetric transmission and acceptance 
of feedback are not unique to assertiveness, but instead extend to a broader set of behavioral 
dimensions curvilinearly related to outcomes. Study 1 Revisited suggested that negotiators were 
less likely to transmit feedback that encouraged counterparts to decrease versus increase a 
particular behavior (including assertiveness, receptivity, and relationship focus). Similarly, Study 
4 captured leadership effectiveness feedback, showing that over-analyzers (vs. under-analyzers) 
received less feedback about employing an appropriate amount of decision analysis. In my final 
set of analyses in Chapter II, I revisited Study 2, finding that employees were less likely to write 
clear feedback to their coworkers about over-delegating (vs. under-delegating) and about being 
over-receptive (vs. under-receptive), even controlling for how problematic these behaviors were. 
These results also highlighted expectancy of behavioral change (or lack thereof) as a potential 
mechanism for the asymmetric transmission effect. Each of these studies revealed that feedback 
providers were less likely to unambiguously signal feedback advising targets to “do less” versus 
“do more”. 
 Turning to feedback acceptance, I will first note that findings in Study 3 Revisited fit 
with those of the mechanism investigation in Study 2 Revisited. Feedback recipients’ reaction to 
feedback in Study 3 Revisited effectively fulfills feedback providers’ low expectation of targets 
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decreasing problematic behaviors in Study 2 Revisited. Finally, when asked about their main 
takeaways from the large body of feedback, Study 3 Revisited targets indicated that, overall, they 
attended more to feedback suggesting they “do more” versus “do less.”   
Supplemental Analyses 
The Appendix contains additional analyses and commentary on a range of topics and 
questions raised by the results of the present studies. Here, I review the overall conclusions from 
these additional analyses, which help to clarify the implications of the present work. 
One alternative account for the asymmetric transmission of assertiveness feedback is that 
it is simply not clearly problematic to be “over-assertive,” perhaps especially in the context of 
negotiation. If being an “over-assertive” negotiator is not really costly, then it hardly bears 
mention as a developmental need. To examine this issue, I analyzed the link between 
assertiveness and outcomes in Study 1. This analysis of negotiation performance data, including 
final deal terms and relational outcomes, clarified that being over-assertive is not a superior 
negotiation strategy. Compared to appropriately assertive negotiators, over-assertive negotiators 
did not earn significantly better instrumental outcomes and they achieved worse relational 
outcomes. The results indicated that there is no upside to being over-assertive, only a relational 
downside. Findings for under-assertive negotiators show the reverse pattern. Given the 
significant downsides of both behaviors, over-assertiveness and under-assertiveness merit 
correctional feedback that encourages individuals to assert themselves appropriately.   
Another question that may alter interpretations of the asymmetric effects is whether 
perceptions of target assertiveness are affected by perceivers’ own assertiveness. If target 
assertiveness is merely in the eye of the beholder, then the asymmetric transmission and 
acceptance effects would be driven less by the target’s actual behavior, and more by the 
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intersection of the feedback provider and targets’ behavior. Thus, targets would be receiving 
feedback based on a biased impression held by the transmitter. However, I found no relationship 
between the assertiveness of the perceiver and the target, α = .002, p = .95. Thus, indicating that 
targets’ level of assertiveness is the relevant factor, and not merely feedback providers’ 
perception of it. 
Suppositions about variance in the social appropriateness of delivering different 
directions of assertiveness feedback lead to concern about alternative explanations for 
asymmetric communication effects. It seems plausible that the asymmetric transmission of 
assertiveness feedback may have been influenced by feedback providers’ notion that it is socially 
appropriate to provide negative feedback about under-assertiveness with the intention to 
“encourage” an individual to be more assertive, especially in a negotiation, but less respectful or 
appropriate to provide negative feedback about being over-assertive. Indeed, Study 2 Revisited 
suggests that feedback providers consider feedback that advises targets to be less assertive more 
negative than feedback advising targets to be more assertive. Yet, if a difference in feedback 
negativity and not development direction is driving the effects found here, this difference in 
negativity should also exist for opposing directions of feedback pertaining to the additional 
behavioral dimensions examined in Chapter II. Arguably, there should be more negativity 
associated with feedback about analyzing decisions more (vs. less) and delegating less (vs. 
more), both of which might imply that the target is lazy and careless. I would also expect that 
there is more negativity associated with being more (vs. less) receptive, implying that the target 
is closed off to outside input. Yet, I find consistent evidence of asymmetries in the expected 
direction for each of these behaviors. If differences in negativity were underlying the effect, I 
would expect to see the pattern of asymmetric transmission reverse for decision analysis and 
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receptivity feedback. That is, feedback providers should be less likely to say “analyze decisions 
more” and “be more receptive” if they are in fact more negative. I find no such reversal. 
Furthermore, Study 2 gauges the negativity of “do more” versus “do less” feedback pertaining to 
receptivity, delegation, and assertiveness, and I find no differences in valence for any dimension 
except assertiveness. Thus, while differences in the social appropriateness of delivering over- 
versus under-assertiveness feedback may help explain asymmetries in the communication of 
assertiveness feedback, there are several domains of feedback for which it does not seem to play 
a role.  
Another concern is that all of the findings pertaining to assertiveness might instead be 
explained by the target narcissism, which diminishes willingness to accept feedback. Participants 
in Studies 1 and 3 responded to the NPI-16 prior to participating in the Studies described here. 
Results (detailed in the Appendix) show that asymmetric transmission and acceptance effects 
were not influenced by target narcissism. 
More supplemental analyses are detailed in the Appendix including further discussion of 
mechanisms and potential boundary conditions, analyses pertaining to the potential reframing 
strategy, and further analyses of gender data, which do not appear to suggest that asymmetries in 
the transmission and acceptance of feedback vary greatly by whether the feedback provider or 
receiver is a man or woman.  
Implications and Future Directions for Scholarship 
 The account and evidence presented in Chapter I make a notable contribution to 
assertiveness scholarship. They extend the literature by surveying the underexplored topic of 
assertiveness feedback. Chapter I findings shed light on the materialization of over-assertiveness, 
a behavioral problem that individuals are commonly unaware they exhibit (Ames & Wazlawek, 
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2014), and that leads to negative relational and instrumental consequences (e.g, Ames & Flynn, 
2007). Chapter I findings point to asymmetries in feedback communication as one source of 
problematic and persistent assertiveness. 
 The account and evidence in Chapter II step back from assertiveness and make a more 
comprehensive contribution to the feedback literature. This account answers many calls for 
further exploration of variables that impact feedback effectiveness (e.g., Audia & Loke, 2003; 
Ilgen, Fisher, & Taylor, 1979; Kluger & DeNisi, 1996). Past work shows that although it is 
usually beneficial, the effect of feedback on behavioral change is inconsistent, suggesting that 
unexplored factors moderate the relationship. I pinpoint feedback direction as one such 
moderator.   
 My account goes beyond prior work, which differentiates only between positive and 
negative feedback and treat all negative feedback the same. My account suggests that not all 
negative feedback is alike and identifies content-based distinctions within the category of 
negative feedback. I contribute to the feedback literature by distinguishing between two 
opposing development directions of negative feedback, indicating that the target should increase 
versus decrease a behavioral quality. This distinction helps explain differences in feedback 
effectiveness that past accounts could not predict. Indeed, results of Kluger and DeNisi’s (1996) 
meta-analysis indicate that feedback sign distinctions are not enough to predict feedback 
effectiveness. As my work shows, however, perhaps the sharper distinction of development 
direction, within the category of negative feedback, can be the basis for meaningful predictions 
of feedback effectiveness. 
 Furthermore, evidence from Study 2 and Study 2 revisited indicate that this account of 
development direction may help guide researchers to superior predictions about feedback 
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communication than would implicit accounts of problem severity. Latent theories of feedback 
transmission and acceptance may hold that feedback is more readily communicated and 
internalized for behavioral problems with more severe consequences. Again, the sharper 
distinction of development direction, within categories of severity, can lead to more refined 
predictions of feedback effectiveness. 
 My work also extends the feedback literature simply by exploring the neglected topic of 
feedback transmission. Most work on feedback addresses complications with targets’ acceptance 
of feedback, leaving a void of research on issues surrounding the generation and voicing of 
effective feedback. This work helps to fill that void and sets an example of how feedback 
research perhaps ought to be approached: with a commitment to account for both transmission 
and acceptance. Behavior modification via feedback processes requires effective signaling and 
receipt. Considering one without the other is to disregard how feedback functions in one of these 
two interconnected systems. Feedback is ultimately effective only if it succeeds in both. 
Cultivating effective feedback through research thus requires a holistic approach. 
Future work is needed to clarify what mechanisms underlie the identified breakdowns in 
the transmission and acceptance of feedback. Study 2 Revisited results point to expectancy of 
behavioral change as a factor that may play a role. Working professionals in Study 2 Revisited 
indicated a low expectation that targets exhibiting “too much” of a certain behavior would 
actually heed feedback recommending a decrease in that behavior. Indeed, recipients of such 
feedback in Study 3 Revisited indicated their unwillingness to change. Though valence is also a 
contending mechanism, I uncovered less support for it here, finding evidence of its relevance 
only to the behavioral dimension of assertiveness (which is paralleled by mechanistic evidence 
for expectancy of behavioral change). As previously discussed, it is reasonable to expect that the 
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relative  of “increase” versus “decrease” feedback may vary across different dimensions. For 
example, while the evidence indicates that it is more negative to direct a target to be less (vs. 
more) assertive, it is arguably more negative to suggest that a target be more (vs. less) analytical 
when it comes to decision-making. Yet, in both cases I find that feedback is transmitted 
asymmetrically such that feedback providers are more likely to advise targets to increase versus 
decrease these behaviors. Thus, while seemingly relevant in some cases, valence may have more 
selective application as a mechanism of the effect. Behavioral change expectancy receives the 
strongest empirical support as a plausible mechanism. Yet the findings are mixed overall. Future 
work should seek to precisely explain when specific mechanisms influence the asymmetric 
communication of feedback.  
 Future work should also explore boundary conditions of the effect. This investigation of 
asymmetric feedback communication effects has not yielded evidence of a behavioral dimension 
for which the effect reverses or disappears. The theory presented in Chapter II suggests that the 
effect may reverse with respect to behavioral dimensions for which the “decrease” feedback 
indicated more precise guidance than the “increase” feedback. Thus, targets would be more 
likely to accept “decrease” feedback and feedback providers would be more likely to deliver 
such feedback having anticipated its utility. Perhaps behavioral dimension for which the effect 
reverses have a monotonic, negative relationship with outcomes, such that “decrease” feedback 
directs the target to simply terminate the behavior. Feedback to “do nothing” is inherently more 
precise. Study 3 Revisited revealed no significant asymmetry in the acceptance of feedback 
pertaining to dimensions categorized as miscellaneous, suggesting that there are certain 
behavioral dimensions for which the effect does reverse.  
Implications and Future Directions for Application 
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In terms of practical implications, the present research demonstrates that development 
issues requiring a decrease in behavior may be resistant to feedback. Practitioners and 
organizations utilizing performance feedback may want to revise their feedback communication 
procedures for these particular areas of development. Modifying such behaviors may require 
intervening on both feedback providers’ and feedback recipients’ expectancy of behavioral 
change or reframing feedback in an increase direction.  
 Reframing decrease feedback in an increase direction may help boost transmission and 
acceptance. That is, if feedback signaling a decrease in behavior is ineffective, then it may work 
to signal an increase in the opposite behavior instead. This highlights an important unresolved 
question: Why do feedback providers not do this spontaneously? If people are disinclined to say 
“do less” of a certain behavior, it makes sense that they would instead get the message across by 
indicating the opposite behavior and saying “do more” (e.g. instead of saying “be less assertive,” 
they could say “be more accommodating” or instead of saying “delegate less,” they could say 
“take more responsibility”). Supplemental analyses of Study 2 (available in the Appendix) 
indicate that, indeed, feedback providers do not employ this strategy. Of problematically over-
assertive targets, only 30% received feedback about one or more of be less assertive, listen 
better, consider others, watch your temper, or work on relationships, suggesting that feedback 
providers were not finding a way to reframe their “decrease” message as an “increase” message. 
Perhaps feedback providers do not follow this strategy simply because the relevant analogue is 
not always apparent to them. For the reasons described earlier, feedback providers may be 
disinclined to direct targets to decrease behavior, and when providers fail to come up with a 
behavior that serves as the opposite or fail to consider this reframing strategy at all, they may 
cease attempting to get the message across and instead avoid the subject. 
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 Feedback providers’ possible disinclination to reframe the development direction of 
feedback messages as well as feedback providers’ possibly inability to generate behavioral 
analogues suggests a potential intervention. Future work could test whether simply informing 
feedback providers of this strategy and encouraging them to consider reframing feedback to 
recommend an increase of the analogue or going so far as to provide them with relevant 
behavioral analogues might remedy breakdowns in feedback transmission and subsequent 
acceptance.  
From the perspective of the feedback recipient, future work might similarly test whether 
simply encouraging targets to reframe the feedback they receive in an increase direction might 
make it more palatable and yield better acceptance rates. Feedback recipients often have no 
control over the packaging of the feedback they receive. Equipping them to repackage it to their 
liking may prove a powerful strategy. 
One straightforward way to accomplish both of these would be to redesign behavioral 
rating scales so that both the behavior and its analogue are represented. This would not only help 
organizations think more precisely about which behaviors employees should increase and 
decrease, but also inherently supply the feedback provider (and potentially the recipient) with 
two options for framing the feedback. Ideally this would encourage “increase” framing and yield 
higher rates of transmission and acceptance.  
* * * 
Feedback is a signal being returned to its point of origin. It travels back only when 
transmitted by an outside force and reaches its target only if accepted at the source. When both 
aspects of its communication go undisturbed, feedback informs the target about what she sounds 
like in the ears of those who listen. Only when she knows her sound can she change her tune. 
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This research implicates slight signal variations that can lead the entire feedback process to break 
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In the appendix I attend to remaining questions about the asymmetric transmission and 
acceptance effects. I address the methodology employed in Chapters I and II, elaborate on the 
implications of the findings, and note additional important results. I analyze unique data as well 
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Is it better to be over-assertive than under-assertive in a negotiation? 
If feedback providers in Studies 1 and 3 were attributing a target’s successful negotiation 
outcome to the target’s over-assertiveness, this attribution may have decreased feedback 
providers’ likelihood of transmitting over-assertiveness feedback. If over-assertive negotiators 
are successful, why tell them to change? Although I acknowledge the possibility for this to 
confound my results, I believe the procedural design prohibited such attributions from ever being 
a factor. Nonetheless, I have negotiation outcome data that addresses the issue. 
Study 1 was designed such that feedback providers rated targets’ assertiveness and wrote 
feedback prior to learning what share of the bargaining zone the target had earned. That is, 
feedback providers did not know how well the target performed until after their ratings and 
written feedback were collected. Thus, aside from guessing what share of the bargaining zone the 
target earned, feedback providers were unable to attribute any real knowledge of the target’s 
negotiation success to over-assertiveness prior to writing feedback because they were not 
informed about the target’s performance until afterward. The study timeline made it impossible 
for such an attribution to affect the transmission of feedback.   
A remaining question is whether over-assertive negotiators do perform better in 
negotiation. In addition to the assertiveness ratings data reported on in the manuscript, I also 
collected the final deal terms of each negotiation and negotiators’ ratings of several relational 
outcomes including “Now, after the negotiation, do you feel like you could trust your partner in 
future negotiations?”, “Do you feel that your partner is a good, likeable person?”, and “Do you 
look forward to future interactions and teamwork with your partner?” Each item was rated on a 
scale from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree). I averaged these items to create a 



































Figure	  2.	  Over-­‐assertive	  negotiators	  did	  not	  achieve	  significantly	  greater	  instrumental	  
outcomes	  than	  appropriately	  assertive	  negotiators.	  Under-­‐assertive	  negotiators	  
achieved	  significantly	  worse	  instrumental	  outcomes	  than	  both	  appropriately	  assertive	  





In sum, compared to appropriately assertive negotiators, over-assertive negotiators did 
not earn significantly better instrumental outcomes and they achieved worse relational outcomes. 
There is no upside to being over-assertive, only a relational downside. Furthermore, relational 
losses can translate to future instrumental losses. Repeat negotiation partners may choose to 
sabotage dealmaking with someone who has behaved inappropriately in the past. Similarly, 
compared to appropriately assertive negotiators, under-assertive negotiators do not earn 
significantly better relational outcomes and they achieve worse instrumental outcomes. There is 
no upside to being under-assertive, only an instrumental downside. Appropriately assertive 
negotiators avoid instrumental and relational downsides, earning the overall best outcomes. 
Given these significant downsides, I believe that both over-assertiveness and under-assertiveness 

































Figure	  3.	  Over-­‐assertive	  negotiators	  achieved	  significantly	  worse	  relational	  outcomes	  than	  
both	  appropriately	  assertive	  and	  under-­‐assertive	  negotiators.	  Under-­‐assertive	  negotiators	  





appropriately.   
A related question is that of whether behaving under-assertively in negotiations seen as a 
riskier strategy than behaving over-assertively? Unfortunately, I do not have data that would 
directly address whether novice MBA student evaluators in this context perceive under-
assertiveness to be a riskier behavior than over-assertiveness for an individual's personal 
negotiation success. But to speculate, although the fixed pie mindset does loom large, a 
significant amount of students enter the class with the aim of learning to improve their 
interactions with the other party during a negotiation. Yes they want to win, but they want to do 
so while applying the right touch. Many students specifically cite their desire to learn to craft a 
more amicable negotiation interaction as a learning objective for the course. 
If given a forced choice between being over-assertive and under-assertive, a majority of 
students might still choose to be over-assertive in their best attempt to preserve instrumental 
success. However, my experience tells me that a vast majority strive to strike the right balance. 
Finding a way to be appropriately assertive is still a priority for students, and I think it is 
fascinating that, despite having this goal, their developmental feedback is so one-sided. The 
asymmetric transmission effect I find in Study 1 is notably large (52% of under-assertive vs. 6% 
of over-assertive individuals received feedback about being more appropriately assertive). I 
seriously doubt that students’ perceptions of which behavior is riskier were proportional to this 
effect. Furthermore, even if students perceive over-assertiveness as less risky, I believe they 
would still see it as a negative behavior that merits correctional feedback, given their expressed 
desire to strike the right balance. 
I aimed to address concerns about under-assertiveness posing a more critical need for 
development than over-assertiveness in Study 2 by specifically capturing feedback providers’ 
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perceptions of this need. After rating their coworker’s assertiveness, participants indicated 
whether their coworker’s level of assertiveness was 1) not really a problem, development is not 
needed, 2) Somewhat of a problem, development is somewhat needed, and 3) definitely a 
problem, development is definitely needed. The asymmetric transmission effect holds in this 
Study when the sample is limited to feedback for coworkers whose level of assertiveness was 
rated “definitely a problem, development is definitely needed”. 
 
Does the valence of “over” versus “under” feedback explain the asymmetries?  
Study 2 Revisited analyses address concerns about differences in the valence of feedback 
that differs in development direction. Here, I considered two potential mechanisms for the 
asymmetric transmission effect. First I consider differences in the valence of feedback of 
opposing development directions. Second, I consider a difference in providers’ expectation that 
their feedback will effect behavioral change in the target. I evaluated each with a set of follow up 
questions posed to feedback providers about their anticipated experience of delivering feedback. 
Using these questions, I created two scales. The first scale pertained to feedback valence. Items 
included “giving this person feedback about their behavior would harm our relationship”, “I 
might offend this person by giving them feedback about their behavior”, and “This person might 
react negatively to feedback about their behavior” (α = .92). The second scale pertained to the 
likelihood of effecting behavioral change. Items included “This person cares about improving 
their performance”, “Giving this person feedback might help them change and improve”, and 




Results indicated that different or multiple mechanisms may be operating behind the 
asymmetric transmission effect as it pertains to different behavioral dimensions. Feedback 
providers perceived no differences in the valence of or the likelihood of impacting behavioral 
change with receptivity feedback that differs in development direction. Feedback providers 
perceived no difference in the valence of delegation feedback that differs in development 
direction, however they did perceive over-delegating feedback as less likely to impact behavioral 
change than under-delegating feedback. Finally, feedback providers perceived over-assertiveness 
feedback as having a more negative valence than under-assertiveness feedback, and also 
perceived over-assertiveness feedback as less likely to impact behavioral change than under-
assertiveness feedback.  
In determining what mechanism explains the asymmetric transmission effect, these 
findings point most strongly to the expectancy of the feedback effecting behavioral change. 
Results indicate that this mechanism plays a role in the asymmetric transmission of both 
assertiveness and delegation feedback. More broadly, however, these findings reveal that the 
process or combination of processes operating behind the asymmetric effect may vary.  
The data repeatedly reveal strong support for the asymmetric transmission effect across a 
myriad of different behavioral dimensions. Given that the potential impact of this effect extends 
to such a large body of feedback, it makes sense that more than one mechanism may be in play. 
One’s perception of whether his feedback will do any good, or whether he will just be wasting 
his breath likely plays a key role in his decision to transmit. Yet, feedback providers are no doubt 
influenced by different or numerous processes based on what topics they are considering to 
discuss. Indeed, results indicate that, in combination with the anticipated likelihood of behavioral 
change, valence does play a role in the asymmetric transmission of assertiveness feedback. 
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Given the results of the mechanism test, however, I do not believe that this is the sole 
explanation for the results.  
Interestingly, the mechanism results that pertain to receptivity reveal that other 
mechanisms yet to be test may play a role. More investigation is needed to elucidate what 
specific mechanism may underlie this particular instance of asymmetric transmission. I 
anticipated unique results when testing potential mechanisms associated with asymmetric 
transmission of feedback pertaining to receptivity. Unlike the other two dimensions, receptivity 
is overlapping with likelihood of behavioral change. By definition, overly receptive individuals 
accept and internalize too much feedback. Somewhat surprisingly, overly receptive targets were 
not seen as more likely to act on pertinent feedback than under-receptive targets. One might 
anticipate a reversal of the expectancies of behavioral change here—over-receptive changing 
more and under-receptive changing less. Perhaps the lack of reversal is due to the mutually 
exclusive nature of essentially telling someone who accepts too much feedback to stop accepting 
feedback. Both accepting and rejecting such feedback would lead to no change in the target’s 
behavior. This conundrum possibly complicates feedback provider’s assessments of expected 
behavioral change. 
In considering competing alternative explanations for asymmetries in assertiveness 
feedback, another complication arises. Blending discussions on the valence of assertiveness 
feedback and effectiveness of over-assertive behavior reveals that these two are somewhat in 
conflict: if over-assertiveness is a more effective strategy then why does over-assertive feedback 
have a more negative valence? Would it not be less negative to hear that one is employing a 
more effective strategy? Study 2 Revisited results showing that over-assertiveness feedback has a 
more negative valence than under-assertiveness feedback are at odds with the negotiation 
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outcome data (page 57) showing that over-assertiveness is not a more effective negotiation 
strategy. Similarly, results from Study 3 indicate that participants rated their coworkers over-
assertive behavior more problematic (M = 2.07, SD = .69) than their coworkers’ under-assertive 
behavior (M = 1.79, SD = .69; t(140) = -2.42, p = .02) using a three-point scale including 1 (Not 
really a problem, development is not needed), 2 (Somewhat of a problem, development is 
somewhat needed), and 3 (Definitely a problem, development is definitely needed). Do 
individuals hold contradictory perceptions of over-assertiveness feedback as more negative, yet 
perceive of over-assertiveness as a more effective strategy? Or do they instead understand the 
ineffectiveness of over-assertiveness and have other reasons for perceiving relevant feedback as 
negative?   
Perhaps the answer lies in whether the target is intentionally employing such a strategy 
and aware of their over-assertiveness. Over-assertive and aware individuals may perceive it as a 
more effective strategy and thus not perceive the feedback as negative. While over-assertive and 
unaware individuals may perceive it as less effective and take offence with the feedback. Perhaps 
this topic merits further investigation. At present, the results indicate that, yes, being told that 
one is being too assertive might be taken as more of a criticism and as less constructive than 
being told that one needs to be more assertive. 
 
Are target assertiveness ratings affected by the rater’s assertiveness? 
I might interpret my findings differently if perceptions of target assertiveness are affected 
by the perceiver’s own assertiveness. It is reasonable to expect that highly assertive perceivers 
under-rate targets’ assertiveness and unassertive perceivers over-rate targets’ assertiveness. That 
is, perhaps it takes a lot of assertiveness for a jerk to consider a target over-assertive, and only a 
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little assertiveness for a wimp to consider a target over-assertive. Assuming over-assertive 
individuals have a high threshold for finding someone inappropriate and under-assertive 
individuals are more sensitive and quick to apply the label, this makes sense. If this were true, 
there might actually be multiple different sets of “over-assertive” targets: those considered over-
assertive by only by under-assertive perceivers, by under- and appropriate perceivers, and by all 
perceivers. Thus, while the over-assertive label would be in the eye of the beholder, the actual 
relative behavior of these targets would be increasingly assertive, respectively. This would 
indicate that the asymmetric transmission and acceptance effects are driven by the perceiver’s 
categorization, not the target’s actual behavior. Even so, the asymmetric transmission effect 
might remain interesting: assertiveness feedback is less likely to be delivered to those perceived 
as over-assertive by the feedback provider. Additionally, the asymmetric acceptance effect might 
also remain interesting: assertiveness feedback is less likely to be accepted when the direction of 
that feedback is to decrease versus increase assertiveness, regardless of the target’s actual 
assertiveness level.  
Alas, I find no relationship between the assertiveness of the perceiver and the target, α = 
.002, p = .95. This suggests that perceptions of assertiveness are not merely in the eye of the 
beholder and indeed there is something about the target’s actual behavior that is driving the 
effects. 
 
What feedback do over-assertive individuals receive? What does their feedback indicate if 
not that they should modify behavior? 
My consistent finding that over-assertive individuals do not receive feedback about 
decreasing their assertiveness raises a question about what exactly those comments do indicate.  
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In Study 1, in addition to using the 5-point scale (1 (Very under-assertive), 2 (Somewhat 
under-assertive), 3 (Appropriately assertive), 4 (Somewhat over-assertive), and 5 (Very over-
assertive)) to rate the written feedback, online judges also had the option of checking a box titled 
“not applicable—this feedback indicates nothing about assertiveness.” Including this option 
allowed me to distinguish whether the feedback was ambiguous about assertiveness or is instead 
implied that the target’s assertiveness was appropriate. If the feedback was ambiguous about 
assertiveness, I expected online judges to select the “not applicable” box. If the feedback implied 
that the target’s assertiveness was appropriate, I instead expected online judges select 
“appropriately assertive.”  
As a reminder of the main results, 52% of under-assertive negotiators were told to be 
more assertive while 6% of over-assertive negotiators were told to be less assertive. Thus a vast 
majority of over-assertive negotiators received feedback that did not indicate they should be less 
assertive. Of the feedback given to over-assertive negotiators, 20% was rated “not applicable—
this feedback indicates nothing about assertiveness” by online judges and 74% was rated 
“appropriately assertive.” This indicates that a majority of over-assertive negotiators received 
feedback that was not only devoid of any signal to be less assertive, but also indicated that they 
were appropriately assertive. A majority of this feedback is actually validating the behavior of 
over-assertive negotiators rather than correcting it or even obscuring the issue.    
As a point of comparison to feedback given to under-assertive negotiators, 6% was rated 
“not applicable” by online judges and 42% was rated “appropriately assertive.” Thus, a similar 
pattern is present among feedback given to both over- and under-assertive negotiators. That is, in 
the absence of a proper signal about how to modulate their assertiveness, negotiators were more 
likely to receive validation of their assertiveness level. The key difference in the pattern of 
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results for under-assertive versus over-assertive negotiators stems from the main effect. Over-
assertive negotiators are less likely to receive a proper signal about how to modulate their 
assertiveness, thus the amount of feedback rated “Appropriate” and “Not applicable” was greater 
for over- versus under-assertive negotiators. 
In Study 2, again I found that only 11% of over-assertive individuals in the sample 
received assertiveness feedback. I coded these feedback comments in an effort to determine what 
exactly feedback providers were telling these over-assertive targets, if not to be less assertive. I 
thought they might be delivering a message similar to “be less assertive” in a more roundabout 
way, thus looked to see if the feedback contained things like suggestions to listen better or work 
on interpersonal relationships.  
Results revealed that such messages were scarce as well (see figure 3). Overall, only 30% 
of problematically over-assertive targets received feedback about one or more of be more 




Furthermore, coding revealed that a good share of feedback comments contained 
performance compliments such as “your job performance is great” or “you do a wonderful job.” 
Among the feedback comments written to under-assertive + problematic coworkers, 39.13% 
contained a performance compliment. In contrast, among those written to over-assertive + 
problematic coworkers, 58.93% contained a performance compliment (X
2
(1,102) = 3.96, p < 
.01). Over-assertive + problematic coworkers were more likely to receive a performance 
compliment than under-assertive + problematic coworkers. This suggest that over-assertive 
coworkers were more likely than under-assertive coworkers to receive performance 
compliments, potentially leading them to conclude that their behavior is effective and their 
development needs are modest. 
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Do problematically over-assertive individuals receive less feedback in general (additional 
Study 3 analyses)? 
Results consistently show that over-assertive individuals are less likely to receive 
assertiveness feedback, but what about other feedback. Do over-assertive individuals generally 
receive less feedback? The answer may help shed light on the mechanism of the effect. If over-
assertive individuals do generally receive less feedback, perhaps there is something unique about 
over-assertive individuals that wards off input and advice from others. On the other hand, if 










































something unique about the difference between different directions of feedback. Indeed, I do not 
find that over-assertive individuals receive a general lack of feedback. Over-assertive coworkers 
in Study 3 were no more likely than under-assertive coworkers to receive feedback about 
delegation (X2(1,49) = 0.36, p = 0.55), time management (X2(1,32) = 0.01, p = 0.9), decision 
making (X2(1,54) = 0.02, p = 0.88), receptivity (X2(1,48) = 0.01, p = 0.9, self-other focus 
(X2(1,60) = 1.15, p = 0.28), or communication (X2(1,41) = 0.04, p = 0.83). 
 
What is it like to bargain with an over-assertive negotiator? 
In addition to rating their counterpart’s assertiveness, following their negotiations 
participants responded to numerous questions about their experience during the task and their 
perception of their counterpart. I compared average responses to a number of these items for 
participants who negotiated with an over-assertive, under-assertive, or appropriately assertive 





1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  
Made	  extreme	  or	  bold	  offers	  	  
Expressed	  negative	  emotions	  in	  unconstructive	  
ways	  	  
Took	  steps	  to	  diffuse	  any	  tension	  	  
Made	  meaningful	  concessions	  	  
Displayed	  competitive,	  aggressive	  behavior	  	  
Seemed	  more	  interested	  in	  getting	  a	  good	  deal	  than	  
in	  being	  a	  nice	  person	  	  
Listened	  actively	  and	  effectively	  	  
Speci:ic	  behaviors	  of	  under-­‐	  and	  over-­‐assertive	  negotiators	  (as	  





Figure	  6.	  Participants	  who	  negotiated	  with	  over-­‐assertive	  versus	  under-­‐assertive	  individuals	  were	  
less	  likely	  to	  indicate	  that	  their	  counterpart	  listened	  effectively,	  made	  meaningful	  concessions,	  
took	  steps	  to	  diffuse	  tension,	  and	  more	  likely	  to	  indicate	  that	  they	  seemed	  deal-­‐focused	  rather	  
than	  relationship	  focused,	  competitive	  and	  aggressive,	  expressed	  unconstructively	  negative	  
emotion	  and	  made	  extreme	  offers. 
	  





Happy,	  pleased	  	  
How	  counterparts	  feel	  after	  negotiating	  with	  an	  under-­‐	  or	  




Figure	  7.	  Participants	  who	  negotiated	  with	  over-­‐assertive	  versus	  under-­‐assertive	  individuals	  were	  





Evidence of conscious disregard of feedback (additional Study 3 analyses) 
Study 3 results suggest that over-assertive individuals consciously disregarded even 
concrete assertiveness feedback. I followed up with participants 6 months later and asked them 
to try and recall the average assertiveness rating they received in the feedback report given to 
them 6 months earlier. Specifically I provided them with the scale they were originally rated on 
(1, Very under-assertive; 2, Somewhat under-assertive); 3, Appropriately assertive; 4, Somewhat 
over-assertive; and 5, Very over-assertive) and asked them to indicate their average score in 
numerical format. Most over- and under- assertive targets successfully recalled what this rating 
indicated about their classmate’s perception of them. Over-assertive targets’ average response to 
this question was significantly greater than 3—the scale point corresponding to “Appropriately 
assertive”, t(30) = 3.90, p < .01). Under-assertive targets’ average response to this question was 
less than that of over-assertive targets (t(46) = -3.7, p < .01) and not significantly different from 
3 (t(21) = -1.8, p = .08). Thus, Over-assertive targets disregarded feedback about their 
assertiveness upon receiving it and showed no change of heart six months later, yet were aware 
of the results enough that they accurately recalled the feedback six months later. This suggests 
that over-assertive targets understood the implications of their feedback but consciously chose to 
disregard it.   
 
When does the effect reverse? 
In my investigation of these asymmetric feedback communication effects, I have not 
come across a behavioral dimension for which the effect reverses, though I do find the thought of 
this possibility very intriguing. In line with feedback intervention theory, my theory suggests that 
such a reversal could occur if the “decrease” feedback for some behavioral dimension pointed to 
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the correct solution or featured specific guidance on how to improve more so than the “increase” 
feedback. In such a case, “over” versus “under” targets might be more likely to accept feedback 
and feedback providers might be more likely to anticipate that acceptance and deliver feedback 
to “overs” versus “unders.” I have yet to come across such a behavioral dimension, and remain 
convinced that the aforementioned qualities are inherent to “increase” feedback and not 
“decrease” feedback. Perhaps “decrease” feedback is more readily transmitted and accepted for 
dimensions with a monotonic, negative relationship with outcomes (e.g., “stop complaining”) 
because the recommendation is simply to cease the behavior and do nothing (as opposed to doing 
something different). Yet dimensions with a monotonic effect on outcomes are not the focus of 
this work.  
That said, in Study 3 Revisited I found nonsignificant asymmetry in feedback pertaining 
to miscellaneous dimensions that have a curvilinear effect on outcomes. In fact, here the results 
were trending in the “reverse” direction. This hints that perhaps a dimension does exist for which 
the asymmetric feedback effect is reversed and begs for further investigation.  
 
Narcissism considered as an alternative explanation 
I asked MBA student targets in Studies 1 and 3 to respond to the NPI-16 prior to 
participating in the described methods. Asymmetric transmission and acceptance effects were not 
influenced by target narcissism. Though it makes more theoretical sense to investigate the role of 
target narcissism in asymmetric acceptance (I elaborate on this later), I have detailed the findings 
on how narcissism related to both transmission and acceptance of feedback.  
Study 1. I tested whether narcissism was an alternative explanation for asymmetry in 
feedback transmission. I had no a priori hypotheses about the effect of narcissism on feedback 
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transmission and found none. Results did not differ based on target narcissism. Participants 
considered over-assertive by counterparts scored higher on the NPI-16 M = .53, SD = .22) than 
did those considered under-assertive (M = .34, SD = .20; t(21) -2.12, p = .05). However, target 
NPI-16 scores did not predict transmission of assertiveness feedback among under-assertive or 
over-assertive targets. Addiationally, both under- and over-assertive participants who received no 
assertiveness feedback scored higher on average on the NPI-16 (M = 0.47, SD = 0.22) than 
participants who did receive assertiveness feedback (M = .35, SD = .19; t(59) -2.26, p = .03). 
However, the asymmetries in the stated results hold within participants who scored the highest 
and lowest on the NPI.  
We did not measure feedback providers’ perception of target narcissism, though arguably 
such data would be more meaningful in this context. Feedback providers’ perception of the 
target, rather than the target’s true attributes, should have a primary effect on providers’ 
transmission of feedback. A more complete investigation of this question would necessitate 
measurement of feedback provider’s perception of target narcissism and, furthermore, perhaps 
exploration of the impression that a narcissistic target’s attributes make on the potential feedback 
provider’s transmission of feedback. 
Study 3. Results did not differ based on target narcissism. Though, over-assertive targets 
scored significantly higher on the NPI-16 (M= .42, SD = .19) than under-assertive targets (M= 
.26, SD = .20; t(75) = -3.49, p < .01), the asymmetries in the stated results held within 
participants who scored the highest and lowest on the NPI. 
Participants who cited assertiveness feedback as a main takeaway (whether to be more or 
less assertive) scored lower on the NPI-16(M = .25, SD = .18) than those who did not cite 
assertiveness feedback (M = .40, SD = .20; t(86) = 3.26, p < .01). In general, participants who 
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scored higher on the NPI-16 were less likely to mention assertiveness as a main takeaway (R = -
0.31, p < .01). However, asymmetries in the stated results held within participants who scored 
the highest and lowest on the NPI. 
Among the 24 under-assertive targets whose NPI-16 score fell in the bottom third, 
62.50% cited assertiveness feedback as one of their main takeaways. Among the 14 over-
assertive targets whose NPI-16 score fell in the bottom third, 21.43% cited assertiveness 
feedback as one of their main takeaways. Among targets whose NPI-16 score fell in the bottom 
third, under-assertive targets (vs. over-assertive targets) were more likely to cite assertiveness 
feedback as one of their main takeaways (X2 (38) = 5.15, p = .02).  
Among the 4 under-assertive targets whose NPI-16 score fell in the top third, 0% cited 
assertiveness feedback as one of their main takeaways. Among the 13 over-assertive targets 
whose NPI-16 score fell in the top third, 0% cited assertiveness feedback as one of their main 
takeaways. Likely due to the low sample size, there was no difference between under-assertive 
and over-assertive targets citing assertiveness feedback as one of their main takeaways.   
NPI-16 score did not predict agreement with the statement “ I am inclined to disregard 
this feedback about my assertiveness” (b = -.07,t(28) = -0.06, p > .94) 
Participants whose NPI-16 score fell in the bottom third of all participants (M = 3.80, SD 
= 0.76) indicated marginally greater intent to be more assertive in future negotiations than did 
participants whose NPI-16 score fell in the top third M = 3.42, SD = 0.88; t(72) = 1.94, p < .06)).  
Furthermore, the average response of participants whose NPI-16 score fell in the bottom third of 
all participants (M = 3.80, SD = 0.76) was significantly higher than 3 —the scale item 
corresponding to “neither more nor less assertive” (t(49) = 7.48, p < .01). Similarly, the average 
response of participants whose NPI-16 score fell in the top third of all participants (M = 3.42, SD 
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= 0.88) was also significantly higher than 3 (t(23) = 2.32, p < .04). Thus, participants were 
equally likely to indicate intent do modulate their assertiveness in future negotiations regardless 
of NPI-16 score.  
 
Gender differences (additional analyses) 
The effect of perceiver and target gender on perceptions of assertiveness, as well as the 
effect of feedback provider gender and target gender on feedback transmission are important and 
interesting questions that merit proper investigation. Past work on gender, particularly in the 
context of negotiation, would suggest that female targets are seen as more assertive than men for 
performing the same behaviors. Future work on the impact of gender on feedback transmission 
and acceptance could yield implications that lead to a more efficient design of performance 
feedback systems. Though the studies were not specifically designed to test this, I have 
conducted extensive analyses using the demographic information collected.  
Overall, I found very few gender effects in the data. In Study 2, participants were more 
likely to write feedback to a coworker of the same sex (X2 (1, 154) = 12.70, p < .01; note, this 
does not pertain to asymmetric transmission of feedback according to development direction). 
The idea that people give more feedback to those who share their gender is an interesting idea 
that merits future work. The Study 2 design involved participants choosing three coworkers 
whom they knew well. Participants were then asked to write feedback to one coworker, 
randomly selected from this set. Thus, this finding should not be interpreted as more than an 
indication that participants are likely to know their same sex versus opposite sex, coworkers 
well. 
In Study 3a, females were less likely than males to be considered over-assertive (21.62% 
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of females vs. 49.28% of males; X2 (106) = 7.70, p < .01). This is contrary to what the gender 
literature would suggest and may be due to stereotype inhibition. 
Finally, in Study 3b, using a scale that included 1 (Very under-assertive), 2 (Somewhat 
under-assertive), 3 (Appropriately assertive), 4 (Somewhat over-assertive), and 5 (Very over-
assertive), females rated females (M = 2.85 SD = .52) marginally less assertive than males rated 
females (M = 3.03 SD = .72; t(186) = -1.84, p = .07). This suggests that males may be more 
harsh judges of female assertiveness than males.  
This is the extent of the significant findings. A complete set of gender related analyses is 
below. 
Study 1. Though I had no a priori hypotheses about gender effects, I tested for them in the data. 
Results did not differ based on target gender.  
Sex data for 15 out of the 300 targets in the sample was missing. Of the 120 female 
targets in the sample, 35.00% were rated under-assertive by their original counterpart or 
observer. Of the 165 males in the sample, 32.12% were rated under-assertive. Females were no 
more likely than males to be considered under-assertive (X2 (1, 285) = .26, p = .61).  
Of the 120 females in the sample, 35.00% were considered over-assertive. Of the 165 
males in the sample, 30.91% were considered over-assertive. Females were no more likely than 
males to be considered over-assertive (X2 (1, 285) = .53, p = .47).   
Sex data was missing for 7 of the 150 targets in the sample receiving feedback from their 
negotiation counterparts. Of the 21 under-assertive female targets in the sample, 57.143% (12) 
were told by counterparts to be more assertive. Of the 28 under-assertive male targets, 46.429% 
(13) were told by counterparts to be more assertive. Under-assertive female targets were no more 
93	  
	  
likely than under-assertive male targets to be told by counterparts to be more assertive (X2 (1, 49) 
= .55, p > .4). 
Of the 20 over-assertive females targets, 0.05% (1) was told by a counterpart to be less 
assertive. Of the 25 over-assertive male targets, 0.08% (2) were told by counterparts to be less 
assertive. Over-assertive female targets were no more likely than over-assertive male targets to 
be told by counterparts to be less assertive (X2 (1, 45) = .16, p > .6).  
Sex data was missing for 8 of the 150 targets in the sample receiving feedback from their 
negotiation observers. Of the 21 under-assertive female targets in the sample, 76.198% (16) were 
told by observers to be more assertive. Of 25 under-assertive male targets, 60% (15) were told by 
observers to be more assertive. Under-assertive female targets were no more likely than under-
assertive male targets to be told by observers to be more assertive (X2 (1, 46) = 1.36, p > .2).  
Of the 22 over-assertive females targets, 27.272% (6) were told by an observer to be less 
assertive. Of the 26 over-assertive male targets, 15.385% (4) were told by an observer to be less 
assertive. Over-assertive female targets were no more likely than over-assertive male targets to 
be told by an observer to be less assertive (X2 (1, 48) = 1.02, p > .3). 
Sex data for 96 out of the 300 raters in the sample was missing. Of the 28 under-assertive 
female targets in the sample who were told by counterparts or observers to be more assertive, 
17.86% were told by female feedback providers and 53.57% were told by male feedback 
providers (sex data was missing for 9 relevant feedback providers). Of the 28 under-assertive 
male targets in the who were told by counterparts or observers to be more assertive, 25.00% were 
told by female feedback providers and 46.43% were told by male feedback providers (sex data 
was mission for 8 relevant feedback providers; X2 (1, 40) = 0.48, p =.49). Though it appears 
there may be a main effect of feedback provider gender on likelihood of transmitting feedback, 
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male feedback providers were no more likely than female feedback providers to transmit 
feedback (X2 (1, 71) = 0.04, p = .84), there were simply a greater number of male feedback 
providers in the sample. The question of whether males or females are more likely to provide 
feedback is certainly an important and interesting one that merits proper investigation. Such 
work may yield implications that lead to a more efficient design of performance feedback 
systems.  
The sample size of over-assertive targets told to be less assertive was too small to merit 
corresponding analyses. 
While I have reported below the data that is relevant to gender interaction effects in the 
generating feedback phase of Study 1, I maintain that no sound conclusions should be drawn 
from it because the procedure was not designed to test for such effects. 
Sex data for 96 out of the 300 raters in the sample was missing. The 81 female 
counterparts or observers in the sample (for which I also had corresponding data on the target’s 
gender) rated 25.00% of female targets under-assertive, 28.13% of female targets appropriately 
assertive, and 46.88% of female targets over-assertive. Female counterparts or observers rated 
26.53% of male targets under-assertive, 36.73% of male targets appropriately assertive, and 
36.73% of male targets over-assertive. 
The 113 male counterparts or observers in the sample (for which I also had corresponding 
data on the target’s gender) rated 45.10% of female targets under-assertive, 27.45% of female 
targets appropriately assertive, and 27.45% of female targets over-assertive. Male counterparts or 
observers rated 41.94% of male targets under-assertive, 29.03% of male targets appropriately 
assertive, and 29.03% of male targets over-assertive. 
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These data weakly suggests several trends: Female raters are more likely to rate female 
targets over-assertive versus under-assertive or appropriately assertive, female raters are more 
likely to rate female targets versus male targets over-assertive, male raters are more likely to rate 
female targets under-assertive versus appropriately assertive or over-assertive, male raters are 
more likely to rate male targets under-assertive versus appropriately assertive or over-assertive, 
male raters are more likely than female raters to rate female targets under-assertive, female raters 
are more likely than male raters to rate females over-assertive, and male raters are more likely 
than female raters to rate male targets under-assertive. Again, I feel that the question of gender 
interaction effects on the perception of target assertiveness merits future work, however the 
studies in this work are not well designed to test such effects. 
Study 4. Though I had no a priori hypotheses about gender effects, I tested for them in 
the data. Results did not differ based on target gender.  
The proportions of females considered under-analyzers and over-analyzers did not differ 
from those of males (X2 (1, 40) = 0.11, p = .74). Furthermore, the proportion of female under-
analyzers told to increase their decision analysis behavior and female over-analyzers told to 
decrease their decision analysis behavior did not differ from those of males (X2 (1, 20) = .74, p = 
.39; X2 (1, 20) = .02, p = .89). 
Demographic information was not collected for informants, thus interaction analyses 
involving rater gender were not possible. 
Study 2. Though I had no a priori hypotheses about gender effects, I tested for them in 
the data. Results did not differ based on target gender.  
Of the 76 female coworker targets, 47.37% (36) were considered under-assertive. Of the 
78 male coworker targets, 46.15% (36) were considered under-assertive. Female targets were no 
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more likely than male targets to be considered under-assertive (X2 (1,154) = 0.02, p = .88). Of 
the 76 female coworker targets, 43.42% (33) were considered over-assertive. Of the 78 male 
coworker targets, 47.44% (37) were considered over-assertive. Female targets were no more 
likely than male targets to be considered over-assertive (X2 (1, 154) = 0.25, p = .62).  
Male participants (89 total) wrote feedback to 56 (62.92%) male coworker targets and 33 
(37.08%) female coworker targets. Female participants (65 total) wrote feedback to 22 (33.85%) 
male coworker targets and 43 (66.15%) female coworker targets. Participants were more likely 
to write feedback to a coworker of the same sex (X2 (1, 154) = 12.70, p < .01). 
Male participants considered 31 (55.36% of) male coworkers under-assertive, 23 
(41.07% of) male coworkers over-assertive, 17 (51.52% of) female coworkers under-assertive, 
and 14 (42.42% of) female coworkers over-assertive. For male participants, there was no 
relationship between target gender and assertiveness rating (X2 (1, 85) = 0.05, p = .82). 
Female participants considered 5 (22.73% of) male coworkers under-assertive, 14 
(63.64% of) male coworkers over-assertive, 19 (44.19% of) female coworkers under-assertive, 
and 19 (44.19% of) female coworkers over-assertive. For female participants, there was no 
significant relationship between target gender and assertiveness rating (X2 (1, 57) = 2.91, p = 
.09), however there is weak indication that female participants were more likely to rate male 
coworkers over- versus under-assertive. 
Of 36 females rated under-assertive, 66.667% (24) were also rated problematic. Of 36 
males rated under-assertive, 6.11% (22) were also rated problematic. Under-assertive females 
were no more likely than under-assertive males to be rated problematic (X2 (1, 72) = .24, p = 
.62).  
Of 33 females rated over-assertive 87.879% (29) were also rated problematic. Of 37 
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males rated over-assertive, 72.972% (27) were also rated problematic. Over-assertive females 
were no more likely than over-assertive males to be rated problematic (X2 (1, 70) = 2.42, p = 
.12).  
Of 24 under + problematic females, 50.00% (12) were told to be more assertive. Of 22 
under + problematic males, 27.27% (6) were told to be more assertive. Under + problematic 
females were no more likely than under + problematic males to be told to be more assertive (X2 
(1, 46) = 2.49, p = .11).  
Of 29 over + problematic females, 6.90% (2) were told to be less assertive. Of 27 over + 
problematic males, 14.81% (4) were told to be less assertive. Over + problematic females were 
no more likely than over + problematic males to be told to be less assertive (X2 (1, 56) = .92, p = 
.34). 
Female participants were no more likely than male participants to consider under-
assertive or over-assertive behavior problematic (X2 (1, 72) = 1.93, p = .17; X2 (1, 70) = .13, p = 
.72). 
Study 3. While I had no a priori predictions, I also examined gender effects. Females in 
the sample were less likely than males to be considered over-assertive (21.62% vs. 49.28%; 
X2(106) = 7.70, p = .01). No other results differed based on target gender.  
Females in the sample (37 total) were no more likely than males (69 total) to be 
considered under-assertive (35.14% of females vs. 30.43% of males; X2 (106) = .24, p = .62). 
However, females were less likely than males to be considered over-assertive (21.62% of 
females vs. 49.28% of males; X2 (106) = 7.70, p < .01).  
Using a scale that included 1 (Very under-assertive), 2 (Somewhat under-assertive), 3 
(Appropriately assertive), 4 (Somewhat over-assertive), and 5 (Very over-assertive), Females 
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rated males (M = 2.80 SD = .66) no differently than males rated males (M = 2.93SD = .72; t(367) 
= -1.65, p = .10). Females rated females (M = 2.85 SD = .52) marginally less assertive than males 
rated females (M = 3.03 SD = .72; t(186) = -1.84, p = .07). Males rated females (M = 3.03 SD = 
.72) no differently than males rated males (M = 2.93 SD = .72; t(361) = 1.17, p = .24). Females 
rated females (M = 2.85 SD = .52) no differently than females rated males (M = 2.80 SD = .66; 
t(192) = .48, p = .63). 
Females were no more likely to cite assertiveness feedback as a main takeaway than 
males  (45.95% of females vs. 33.33% of males; X2 (106) = 1.63, p = .20). Furthermore, under-
assertive females were no more likely to cite assertiveness feedback as a main takeaway than 
under-assertive males (53.85% of under-assertive females vs. 57.14% of under-assertive males; 
X2 (34) = 0.04, p = .85). Similarly, over-assertive females were no more likely to cite 
assertiveness feedback as a main takeaway than over-assertive males (0% of over-assertive 
females vs. 8.82% of under-assertive males; X2 (42) = 0.76, p = .38).  
Over-assertive versus under-assertive targets’ increased inclination to disregard 
assertiveness feedback did not differ between female and male participants. Over-assertive 
females were more likely to disregard assertiveness feedback (M = 2.13, SD = .84) than under-
assertive females (M = 1.85, SD = .69). However, likely due to the limited amount of females in 
this sample, this difference is not significant (t(19) = -.83, p > .41). This pattern also holds 
among male participants: over-assertive males were more likely to disregard assertiveness 
feedback (M = 2.41, SD = 1.33) than under-assertive males (M = 1.52, SD = .81; t(53) = -2.76, p 
< .01). Under-assertive females were no more likely to disregard assertiveness feedback (M = 
1.85, SD = .69) than under-assertive males (M = 1.52, SD = .81; t(32) = 1.19, p = .24). Finally, 
over-assertive females were no more likely to disregard assertiveness feedback (M = 2.13, SD = 
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.84) than over-assertive males (M = 2.41, SD = 1.33; t(40) = -.581, p = .56).  
Under-assertive versus over-assertive targets’ increased intention to modify their 
assertiveness did not differ between female and male participants. Under-assertive females 
indicated that they intended to be more assertive in future negotiations (M = 4.00, SD = .58) than 
over-assertive females (M = 3.38, SD = .92). However, likely due to the limited amount of 
females in this sample, this difference is not significant (t(19) = 1.93, p < .07). Furthermore, 
over-assertive females’ average response (M = 3.38, SD = .92) was not significantly different 
from 3—the scale item corresponding to “neither more nor less assertive” (t(7) = 1.16, p > .28). 
That of under-assertive females (M = 4.00, SD = .58) was significantly greater than 3 (t(12) = 
6.25, p < .01). This pattern also holds among male participants: under-assertive males indicated 
that they intended to be more assertive in future negotiations (M = 4.19, SD = .60) than over-
assertive males (M = 3.12, SD = .84; t(53) = -2.64, p < .01). Furthermore, over-assertive males’ 
average response (M = 3.12, SD = .84) was not significantly different from 3 (t(33) = .81, p > 
.42). That of under-assertive males (M = 4.19, SD = .60) was significantly greater than 3(t(20) = 
9.07, p < .01). Under-assertive females intentions (M = 4.00, SD = .58) did not significantly 
differ from those of under-assertive males (M = 4.19, SD = .60; t(32) = -.91, p > .36). And 
finally, over-assertive females intentions (M = 3.38, SD = .92) did not significantly differ from 




The 150 feedback comments coded in Study 1 were randomly selected from a total pool of 1220 
comments given to under- and over-assertive negotiators in our sample. Twelve comments (8%) 
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were excluded and replaced by another comment randomly selected from the larger pool  
because they contained too much negotiation jargon (e.g. “BATNA”, “resistance point” or 
specifics about the negotiation exercise for online coders to understand (e.g. “plant not valued at 
$28M with market decline of 5% and past year's plant valuation of $19M”). 
 
This discussion of excluded data has been footnoted on page 15. 
 
Study 2 




No data was excluded from Study 3a and 3b.  
The measures reported in Studies 3a and 3b came from larger surveys that included many 
measures not relevant to our research question. See tables 2 - 4 for a list of measures not reported 










I was surprised by my partners’ rating of my assertiveness 3.41 3.63 ns 
I have received similar feedback about my assertiveness before 4.68 4.72 ns 
I view these ratings of my assertiveness as important 
meaningful, and valuable 5.82 5.63 
ns 
I think my partners were using the wrong standards for judging 
my assertiveness 2.44 2.70 
ns 
I think my partners’ judgments of my assertiveness are 
reliable, valid, and accurate 2.82 2.91 
ns 
I think m partners misinterpreted my behavior and actions 5.44 5.37 ns 
 











Beyond this class, how do you think your assertiveness is 
perceived in general?  2.62 3.15 
ns 
 
Table 3. Additional Study 3a measures. Rated on a five-point scale including 1 (Very under-assertive), 2 (Somewhat 
under-assertive), 3 (Appropriately assertive), 4 (Somewhat over-assertive), and 5 (Very over-assertive) 
 
 
Measure M SD 
Imagine that a Columbia student received an average 
assertiveness rating greater than 3. That is, they were rated by 
classmates as over-assertive. 
  
To what extent is this a problem for that student and to what 
extent does it matter? Is it important that the student take steps 
to decrease their level of assertiveness? 
 
2.95 0.78 
Imagine that a Columbia student received an average 
assertiveness rating greater than 3. That is, they were rated by 
classmates as under-assertive. 
  
To what extent is this a problem for that student and to what 
extent does it matter? Is it important that the student take steps 




Table 4. Additional Study 3b measures. Rated on a five-point scale from 1 (Not really a problem, development is not 
important) to 5 (Definitely a problem, development is definitely important). Under-assertiveness was rated as 
significantly more of a problem than over-assertiveness (t(85) = -7.85, p < .01). Unfortunately these questions were 
asked at the wrong point in time and of the wrong population to infer any mechanism. Future work should ask these 
questions of feedback providers before they generate feedback and feedback recipients before they receive feedback 
in order to determine whether variation in perceptions of importance affects transmission and acceptance of 
feedback.    
Study 4 
The measures reported in Study 4 came from a larger survey that included many measures not 




1. When making a decision, s/he seeks information from a diverse array of 
resources 
2. S/he defines problems effectively and gets to the heart of a problem 
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3. S/he makes effective use of other people's advice in making decisions 
4. S/he misjudges people's personality and character  
5. S/he is good at sensing what other people are thinking and feeling 
6. S/he fails to realize the impact of what s/he says and does on others  
7. S/he is good at assessing other people's strengths and weaknesses 
8. S/he is able to empathize and understand someone else's perspective 
9. S/he neglects to recognize others for their contributions  
10. S/he maintains focus on the task at hand 
11. S/he sets achievable, yet challenging goals for others and him/herself 
12. S/he is not effective at giving helpful/constructive feedback to others  
13. S/he find ways to make his/her work and others' work more enjoyable 
14. S/he is able to build effective working relationships with others who have 
different opinions or interests 
15. The substance of his/her messages gets lost because of how they are 
communicated  
16. S/he is able to persuade other people and change their opinions 
17. S/he fails to direct and steer meetings in his/her favor  
18. S/he is able to build coalitions to get things done 
19. S/he is good at generating innovative solutions to resolve conflicts 
20. S/he fails to consider the viewpoints of other parties involved in a conflict  
21. S/he is able to debate issues without getting personal or emotional 
22. S/he worsens conflicts  
23. S/he chooses and fights the right battles 
24. When working in a team, s/he makes sure everybody is kept informed and in the 
loop 
25. S/he creates an atmosphere in which group members feel free to disagree with 
one other 
26. S/he is unwilling to sacrifice his/her self interest for the good of the team  
27. S/he takes initiative in contributing to the team's efforts 
28. When working on a group project, s/he tends to want to do it all him/herself  
29. Strengths as a colleague and leader: 
30. Areas for improvement: 
31. Advice: 
32. When someone else is speaking, s/he interrupts and/or shows impatience  
33. As a listener, s/he gets others to open up, elaborate, and share information 
34. S/he listens effectively to criticism and alternative points of view 
35. When someone else is speaking, s/he tends to drift off, appearing distracted or 
inattentive  
36. After listening, s/he builds on what s/he has heard, incorporating it into the 
conversation 
37. When making a point, s/he is concise, brief, and clear 
38. S/he is able to use vivid images and compelling logic and facts to support an 
argument 
39. S/he is unable to communicate effectively in person with larger groups and 
audiences 
40. When communicating with others, s/he is honest, open, and candid 
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41. S/he does not produce well-written work and communications, including letters 
and email  
42. S/he is willing to help when needed 
43. S/he asks for help from others but does not reciprocate in turn  
44. S/he is flexible and tries to accommodate others' needs 
45. S/he goes beyond the 'call of duty' on whatever his/her obligations or 
assignments are 
46. S/he spends too much time assisting or helping others at his/her own expense  
47. S/he speaks up and shares his/her views when it is appropriate 
48. S/he is able to stand his/her ground in a heated conflict 
49. S/he is relentless and pushy in his/her requests of others  
50. S/he is willing to engage in constructive interpersonal confrontations 
51. His/her competitive side comes out to an excessive extent  
52. S/he is extroverted, enthusiastic 
53. S/he is critical, quarrelsome 
54. S/he is dependable, self-disciplined 
55. S/he is anxious, easily upset  
56. S/he is open to new experiences, complex 
57. S/he is reserved, quiet  
58. S/he is sympathetic, warm 
59. S/he is disorganized, careless  
60. S/he is calm, emotionally stable 
61. S/he is conventional, uncreative  
Table 5. Additional Study 4 measures 
  
 
